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Abstract
Studies of terrorism have explored a number of factors thought to drive the phenomenon. Authors
often tie socioeconomic development to reducing terrorism. Among structural explanations of
terrorism, however, authors generally neglect the effect of gender inequality, though studies show that
gender inequality increases the risk of international and civil conflict. Therefore I explore the impact of
gender inequality in important socioeconomic issues on terrorism for 143 countries from 1998-2009. I
argue that socioeconomic gender inequality reflects poor state capacity, resulting in grievances that
contribute to domestic non-suicide and suicide terrorism. I study gender inequality in the areas of
education, labor participation, and life expectancy. Results indicate that education and life expectancy
inequality increase the risk of terrorism, while labor inequality is unrelated. While the time frame and
data used in this study limit generalizability, results indicate that states should provide socioeconomic
gender parity to reduce the risk of domestic terrorism.

Domestic Terrorism, Civil Conflict, Greed, Grievances, State Capacity, Gender Inequality, Education, Life
Expectancy, Labor Participation
vi

“A joke circulating around Riyadh says that the woman most sought after these days is the one with a job”
(Coleman 2004, p. 90).

Introduction
Studies of terrorism – increasingly important in the post-9/11 United States literature – have
explored a number of factors thought to drive the phenomenon. Among these works, which explore
various psychological, rational choice, and structural explanations for terrorism, one important subject
remains neglected: at the structural level, what effect can gender inequality have on terrorism? While
gender inequality appears to increase the risk of both civil and international conflict and some authors
explore gender in terms of psychological motivations for terrorism, researchers have not yet explored
the theoretical and empirical effects of gender inequality as a structural explanation for terrorism.
However, one common research area in terrorism studies as in international and civil conflict studies
focuses on the potential effects of socioeconomic development on terrorism. This type of research
arises from the notion, shared among some scholars and lawmakers, that poverty, low education, poor
health, and other socioeconomic ills drive terrorist activities (Graham 2002). Thus, I feel it is important
to study the potential violent effects of gender inequality in key socioeconomic issues previously tied to
terrorism, which fills an important void in an increasingly relevant field of study.
I argue that socioeconomic gender inequality increases domestic terrorism through two main
causal pathways closely linked to civil conflict: state capacity and grievances. Essentially, gender
inequality represents the broadest form of discrimination in society that reveals weak state capacity and
creates widespread grievances, leading to terrorist attacks aimed at change. My argument is novel
because among terrorism studies that explore structural explanations for terrorist events, authors have
not yet analyzed the greatest structural inequality in a given society: gender inequality. My argument is
also important because I point out a unique structural cause of domestic terrorism that also points to
ways to combat such acts, as well as perhaps the spread of domestic to international terrorism. If
1

socioeconomic gender inequality increases the risk of terrorism, as my results indicate, the state may
then decrease the risk of domestic terrorism by increasing socioeconomic gender parity, thereby
strengthening state capacity, reducing the perception of illegitimacy, and decreasing grievances.
As noted above, scholars claim significant relationships between gender inequality and civil as
well as interstate conflict; this literature reveals that gender parity decreases the risk of both types of
conflict (Caprioli 2000, 2005; Melander 2005; Bussman 2007). In addition, previous work provides
mixed indications on whether socioeconomic development helps fight terrorism, leaving much room for
continuing study on the subject. For instance, some scholars assert that no relationship – or at best an
indirect relationship – exists between socioeconomic factors such as education or income and terrorism
(Krueger and Laitin 2007; Abadie 2006; Krueger and Maleckova 2003). Others, however, maintain the
opposite, arguing that socioeconomic issues directly and significantly relate to terrorism (Freytag,
Krüger, Meierrieks, and Schneider 2009; Burgoon 2006; Azam 2005; Bueno de Mesquita 2005; Erhlich
and Liu 2002). Even within the literature claiming connections between socioeconomic issues and
terrorism, scholars often disagree on the magnitude and direction of the relationships. Nevertheless, in
spite of the number of studies undertaken to reveal factors that drive terrorism, gender inequality has
been virtually ignored in the terrorism literature as a possible structural explanation for terrorism.
While previous work suggests that gender inequality positively relates to both international and
civil conflict and that socioeconomic development reduces the risk of terrorism, the terrorism literature
has not yet theoretically or empirically examined the motivations for domestic terrorist attacks provided
by gender inequality in important socioeconomic indicators. I will attempt to close this gap with an
analysis of this relationship. I argue that gender inequality is a direct, structural cause of domestic
terrorism; it represents the broadest form of discrimination in society and is a manifestation of poor
state capacity that raises the specter of state illegitimacy, resulting in widespread grievances that
contribute to both suicide and non-suicide domestic terrorism. Given the state’s direct influence over
2

public welfare, the state assumes the predominant responsibility for unequal patterns of socioeconomic
development. Essentially, the state’s inability or disinclination to provide equal socioeconomic welfare
in terms of gender leads to poor overall development and a loss of legitimacy, which ultimately invites
terrorist activities from citizens seeking change. Specifically, I study the effects of gender inequality in
the areas of education, labor participation, and life expectancy on domestic non-suicide and suicide
terrorism. My argument invokes two related subsets of the civil conflict literature, “greed and
grievances” and state capacity, both of which appear to influence studies of domestic terrorism.
Therefore, I review both of these literatures, as well as the international and civil conflict literature
regarding gender inequality.
I gather data on domestic non-suicide and suicide terrorism from the RAND Corporation’s RAND
Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents (RDWTI), and I collect gender inequality data from the
World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI) 2010. My empirical results, which cover 143
countries and the years 1998-2009 for total and non-suicide terrorism models and 1999-2009 for suicide
models, suggest that gender inequality does in fact influence the risk of terrorism. Gender inequality in
terms of education and life expectancy robustly increase the risk of total and non-suicide terrorism, and
increase the risk of suicide terrorism in the absence of variables controlling for ethnic fractionalization.
However, gender inequality in terms of labor participation does not appear to have an effect on the risk
of terrorism; I expect that this is due to the state’s greater control over education and health welfare
than economic welfare. While the short time frame of this study limits its generalizability and terrorism
data itself is limited, the results regarding education and life expectancy gaps do indicate that at least in
the post-9/11 world, socioeconomic gender parity is a public good that states should strive to provide to
enhance legitimacy and reduce grievances; in doing so, the state reduces the risk of domestic terrorism.
The following section examines the literature concerning terrorism, civil conflict, and gender
inequality. Subsequently, I introduce my hypotheses, as well as the data and methods that I use.
3

Results of the analyses follow, and I conclude with a discussion of my findings and their policy
implications as well as avenues for future research.

4

Literature
Terrorism
Defining terrorism
Defining terrorism1 has proved difficult for political scientists. A number of varying definitions
abound, though Taylor (2002) finds five basic characteristics of terrorist acts that are similar across most
definitions and differentiate terrorism from other acts of conflict, which I adopt as my working
definition. First, the overarching goal of terrorism is not destructiveness in itself, but political instability;
often, this entails civilian deaths, and acts are targeted at an audience beyond those immediately
affected. Second, terrorist groups possess power inferior to their intended targets, such as the state.
Third, this inequality in power and resources results in methods associated with sporadic violence as
opposed to conventional warfare. Fourth, terrorism is often characterized by decentralization and
committed by loosely connected cells, rather than a tightly organized and hierarchical army. Finally,
publicity is necessary for the success of terrorism. To maximize their gains, terrorists actively court the
media and often decide on targets based on their symbolic value. Crenshaw (1981, p. 395) argues
terrorists’ “justifications usually focus on past suffering, on the glorious future to be created, and on the
regime’s illegitimacy and violence, to which terrorism is the only available response.” Furthermore,
terrorism is characterized by a sense of urgency, in which delay may preclude any action at all against
the state (Crenshaw 1981).

1

As Atran (2003, p. 1534) remarks, “Of course, one side’s ‘terrorists’ may well be another side’s ‘freedom
fighters’.” Though I realize that the use of the term “terrorism” may be inflammatory, I focus on this act because
of its inherently destabilizing nature and the increasing importance of terrorism to the United States, in terms of
both academia and policy, foreign and domestic. Furthermore, I feel that Taylor’s (2002) definition of terrorism,
which I adopt here, aptly differentiates terrorism from other forms of conflict, such as insurgency. In addition,
authors identify all of the groups that I mention here by name as terrorist organizations, and RDWTI, which I use as
my source for terrorism data, closely follows Taylor’s definition of terrorism in classifying and recording incidents
as terrorist acts.
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Furthermore, distinctions must be made between domestic and transnational terrorism.
Transnational terrorism, as might be expected, involves actors and/or territory from multiple countries,
whereas domestic terrorism concerns only one country (Freytag et al. 2009). Despite the visibility of
international terrorist attacks, according to Abadie (2006), domestic terrorist events typically greatly
outnumber their international counterparts. Perhaps due in part to the worldwide media attention
garnered by the September 11, 2001 attacks, the terrorism literature in the United States has responded
to the elevated publicity of transnational terrorism and data constraints by focusing somewhat
disproportionately on this form of terrorism theoretically and empirically, and in many cases scholars
have appeared to attribute both transnational and domestic terrorism to similar causes (Abadie 2006;
Boulden 2009). However, some argue that transnational and domestic terrorist attacks probably have
different roots (Abadie 2006; Ross 1993; Burgoon 2006; Boulden 2009). For instance, Abadie notes that
grievances against wealthy countries seem to drive most modern transnational terrorist events. He
argues that terrorist groups may attack transnational targets to gain the resultant international media
attention to bolster support for their cause, which results in disproportionate numbers of rich countries
as targets of international terrorism. However, Abadie argues that this causal pathway to international
terrorism may not explain domestic terrorism. In many cases, terrorist organizations expand over time
from domestic to interstate terrorism (Dugan, LaFree, and Fogg 2006). Addison and Murshed (2002, p.
1) provide examples of this when they assert that transnational terrorism can occur because domestic
terrorists attack states thought to support their regime’s policies: “When Westerners are kidnapped by
the FARC in Colombia, or the Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines, the political aim of the kidnappers is to
target the policy of support by the West for the government that the terrorists wish to overthrow.”

Causes of terrorism
The research is quite divided on the causes of both transnational and domestic terrorism.
Crenshaw (1981) maintains that the causes of terrorism can be divided into preconditions and
6

precipitants: the former provide the long-term setting for terrorism and the latter are specific events
that provide immediate motivation. Crenshaw (1981, p. 383) argues that precipitants directly cause
terrorism and that “These instigating circumstances go beyond merely creating an environment in which
terrorism is possible; they provide motivation and direction for the terrorist movement. We are dealing
here with reasons rather than opportunities.”
Ross (1993) provides a very useful description of the three main theoretical categories of
oppositional terrorism causes: structural, psychological, and rational choice. Cases of psychological
treatments of terrorism include Krasnov’s (2005) psychological study of Chechen female suicide
bombers as well as Smelser’s (2007) evaluation of Palestinian female suicide terrorists. Examples of
rational choice approaches to the causes of terrorism include Bueno de Mesquita (2005) and Azam
(2005); Bueno de Mesquita formally models recruitment choices for terrorist organizations, and Azam
evaluates suicide terrorism using cost/benefit analyses related to future generations’ welfare. Ross
states that researchers most often use structural models, which explore the impact of political, social,
economic, cultural, and other societal structures on terrorism, due to the relative ease of testing these
models. Considering precipitants as motivational, environmental factors makes them comparable to
structural causes and suggests that structural causes can then directly lead to terrorism. Crenshaw and
Ross (1993) list grievances as a precipitant of terrorism.
Theoretical and empirical studies of terrorism have arguably resulted in two dissenting points of
view– 1) socioeconomic development does not relate to or even increases terrorism– and 2)
socioeconomic development decreases terrorism. Those who support the idea that development
assuages the motivations for terrorism suggest that socioeconomic development helps states avoid
terrorist attacks, while dissenters argue that socioeconomics do not relate to or, in some cases, inversely
relate to terrorism than the manner prescribed by pro-development authors (Burgoon 2006; Ehrlich and
Liu 2002; Taylor 1988; Russell and Miller 1983).
7

Development increases terrorism
Those authors who feel socioeconomics, at best, indirectly relate to terrorist activities widely
cite Krueger and Maleckova’s (2003) work on terrorism, which finds little evidence that education,
wealth, employment, and literacy decrease terrorism or support for terrorism. Among Palestinians,
Krueger and Maleckova’s survey indicates that socioeconomic status has little impact on support for
terrorism. Income and education, in fact, appear to relate positively to terrorism in terms of militant
backgrounds. Turk (1982) predicts these findings two decades before in his discussion of the roots of
terrorism; he argues that while lower classes will likely feel the sting of inequality more so than elites,
elites and youth will ultimately provide the decisiveness and insubordination, respectively, needed to
commit terrorism. Krueger and Maleckova further find, in contrast to socioeconomic development, that
civil liberties significantly and negatively affect terrorism. Similarly, Abadie’s (2006) analysis of
international and domestic terrorism finds that political rights are non-monotically related to terrorism
risk; countries with intermediate levels of political rights are at an increased risk of terrorist events
relative to high or low levels.
While these results appear to discourage a link between socioeconomics and terrorism, Krueger
and Maleckova’s work suffers from a number of flaws. First, all of their data pertains solely to the
Middle East, severely limiting our ability to generalize to other regions. In addition, they provide a
disclaimer about the quality of their data: “The data we present in this paper are often sketchy,
incomplete and possibly nonrepresentative” (Krueger and Maleckova, 2003, p. 121). Finally, Krueger
and Maleckova’s empirical analysis applies strictly to international terrorism. As noted above,
international and domestic terrorism may not originate from the same causes or pursue the same goals,
thus likely limiting the generalization of international terrorism findings to the domestic counterpart.
This issue is perhaps further compounded by the quality of Krueger and Maleckova’s data.
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Despite its limitations, Krueger and Maleckova’s work spawned a number of similar attempts to
refute a relationship between socioeconomics and terrorism. For instance, Abadie’s (2006) analysis of
the effect of political and economic variables on the risk of domestic and international terrorism
similarly finds that income (in terms of GDP per capita) and the Human Development Index (HDI) are
insignificantly related to terrorism. Piazza (2006, p. 160) further explores the association between
socioeconomic development and terrorism, which he coins the “rooted-in-poverty hypothesis.” He
incorporates social cleavage theory, in which various forms of fractionalization in a country can generate
multiple political parties, possibly creating instability and political violence. Piazza finds that social
cleavage theory and political variables such as state repression are significantly, positively related to
international terrorism, whereas socioeconomic variables such as unemployment, poverty, inequality,
and malnutrition appear to have no relationship.
Finally, Krueger and Laitin’s (2007) analysis of the determinants of terrorism provides further
support of the belief that socioeconomic development does not decrease terrorism. Their analysis is
also restricted to international terrorism. They utilize two datasets to disaggregate terrorist events by
the country in which the event occurred, the target country of the event, and the country of citizenship
of the attacker. Their findings indicate that illiteracy does not significantly affect interstate terrorism in
either origin or target countries, whereas GDP per capita positively relates to terrorism in target
countries; the latter finding on GDP per capita is in accordance with Abadie’s (2006) assessment that
international terrorism is often characterized by attacks on rich countries. In addition, a lack of civil
liberties afflicts origin countries, as Krueger and Maleckova (2003) find. However, Krueger and Laitin
offer little theoretical explanation as to why those who are politically repressed would attack rich
foreign targets and conclude that the relationship between socioeconomic development and terrorism
is, at best, indirect.

Development decreases terrorism
9

While the works cited above support Kruger and Maleckova’s (2003) conclusion that political
factors more than socioeconomic ones are the significant determinants of terrorism, other researchers

maintain that socioeconomic factors are germane to terrorism discourse . Graham (2002, p.28)
points out that the impact of economic development in terms of poverty and inequality alleviation on
terrorism has been mixed, but seems to support the idea that international terrorist acts are firmly
related to economic circumstances: “The challenge from international terrorism is, among other things,
a wake-up call to concern ourselves with the fate of poor people in poor countries.” Others have
expressed a similar view that economic issues such as poverty, income inequality, and economic
downturns are positively related to international terrorism (e.g. Drakos and Gofas 2004; Honaker

2004; Blomberg, Hess, and Weerapana 2004; Lai 2007; Blomberg and Hess 2008).
Like Graham (2002), Ehrlich and Liu note that foreign aid has often been utilized against
terrorism due to the anticipated negative correlation between socioeconomic development and
terrorism; thus, the relationship between socioeconomic development and terrorism is an
important one to explore in terms of the potential impact on foreign aid flows. While they stress
that socioeconomics are not the only factors they believe contribute to terrorism, Ehrlich and Liu
expect that these factors play an important role in decreasing terrorist acts. Noting that terrorists
often originate from developing nations, they compare developing to developed countries in terms
of poverty, economic and gender inequality, education, public health, and other factors. They
largely find that developing countries lag far behind the developed world in these indicators,
indicating the potential value of socioeconomic factors in assessing the causes of terrorism.
Burgoon’s (2006) analysis of the effect of social spending on terrorism also supports the idea
that socioeconomic development can decrease terrorism. Burgoon finds, in accordance with Tyson
(2001) and Wolfensohn (2002) that increased government spending on social welfare negatively affects
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terrorism. Burgoon’s results indicate that social welfare spending on health, education, and other public
goods significantly reduces the total number of domestic and international terrorist attacks on a
country’s soil. Freytag et al. (2009) similarly find that government spending decreases terrorist attacks,
though the magnitude of this effect differs by region. Theorizing that socioeconomic indicators function
as proxies for opportunity costs, Freytag et al. also find a non-monotic effect for GDP per capita,
indicating that intermediate economic development leaves states vulnerable to terrorist attacks
originating on their soil.
Bueno de Mesquita’s (2005) formal model of terrorist mobilization provides further support for
the relevance of socioeconomic development to terrorism. He does not deny that terrorist
organizations may attract persons of above-average income or intelligence, as Krueger and Maleckova’s
(2003) work suggests; instead, he maintains that terrorist organizations screen their pools of applicants
for the highest quality recruits, which increases the likelihood of successful terrorist missions. However,
Bueno de Mesquita qualifies this assertion with a note that while terrorist groups may screen
applications, the effect of economic downturns is such that decreasing economic conditions encourage
both desired (in terms of socioeconomic background) and undesired applicants for terror organizations,
and the latter will outnumber the former. This process of mobilization and screening, he argues,
accounts for Kruger and Maleckova’s findings that terrorist groups often employ persons of high levels
of wealth and education relative to the population.
Furthermore, Bueno de Mesquita’s work raises an issue often debated in the terrorism
literature. Bueno de Mesquita recalls, as do Krueger and Maleckova (2003) and Erhlich and Liu (2002),
an oft-quoted statement by a Hamas leader:
“Our biggest problem is the hordes of young men who beat on our doors, clamoring to
be sent. It is difficult to select only a few. Those whom we turn away return again and
again, pestering us, pleading to be accepted” (Hassan 2001, as cited in Bueno de
Mesquita 2005, p. 515).
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This quote and similar ones made to the media or researchers have often been used, as Krueger and
Maleckova do, to indicate that terrorist groups are often comprised not of the most downtrodden
individuals in society, but eager recruits from various backgrounds chosen for their talents and
zealousness. The statement also ostensibly demonstrates that the terrorist organization in question is
well-supplied with recruits and is operationally secure. Krueger and Maleckova use this quote to bolster
support for their findings that education and poverty are generally unrelated or even positively related
to terrorism, while Bueno de Mesquita utilizes the quote for his proposition that terrorist groups screen
potential recruits. However, as Smelser (2007) notes, terrorist organizations and leaders have any
number of incentives to misrepresent themselves or lie to anyone requesting information about their
organization. A terrorist organization would almost certainly wish to be portrayed as viable, popular
among potential recruits, and staffed with persons of above-average intelligence, commitment, and
operational talents such as language, regardless of whether this portrayal approaches truth.
Both Kruger and Maleckova (2003) and Bueno de Mesquita (2005) also mention another
mechanism which would facilitate “elite” recruitment in terrorist organizations – the Robin Hood effect,
as coined by Kruger and Maleckova. This effect describes the process in which individuals of aboveaverage socioeconomic status relative to their society of origin become terrorists in the name of their
downtrodden brethren; these are, paradoxically, altruistic terrorists in a sense, though one could argue
that those who believe the current environment will detrimentally affect that of the near future could
be working to maximize future gains and thus personal utility. Nevertheless, the Robin Hood effect is
theoretically appealing yet empirically elusive; without extensive survey data on terrorist motivations
(which would almost inevitably be plagued by the bias issues mentioned above), empirical support for
the Robin Hood effect remains ambiguous, though researchers such as Bueno de Mesquita and Ehrlich
and Liu (2002) maintain that it has theoretical relevance. If the effect is applicable, findings such as
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those produced by Kruger and Maleckova could lose much of their weight; depressed socioeconomic
conditions could then increase terrorism as well as the quality of terrorists.
Given the theoretical and empirical evidence on terrorism discussed thus far, one can scarcely
say that researchers have reached a consensus on its roots. Further complicating the issue of terrorism
is the fact that the phenomenon must be distinguished yet again between suicide and non-suicide
terrorism. This distinction in method as well as the spectacular media attention accorded to suicide
terrorism has led to discussion among researchers about the possibility of divergent causes for suicide
and non-suicide terrorism. However, as with research on non-suicide terrorism, both international and
domestic, scholars are divided on the potential motives for suicide terrorism.

Suicide Terrorism
Defining suicide terrorism
The definition of suicide terrorism, relative to its non-suicide counterpart, appears to be a less
complex issue. Pape (2003, p.345), one of the leading researchers on suicide terrorism, notes that,
“What distinguishes a suicide terrorist is that the attacker does not expect to survive a mission and often
employs a method of attack that requires the attacker's death in order to succeed.” As with non-suicide
terrorism, suicide attacks are characterized by political goals, civilian casualties, inferior strength relative
to targets, terrorist cells as opposed to isolated individuals, wider intended audiences than those
immediately affected, and media attention (Pape 2003). Just as terrorist groups often evolve from
domestic to international terrorism, Pape notes that suicide terrorism almost always evolves from nonsuicide events. Similarly, Piazza (2008) states that groups that employ suicide terrorism always do so in
conjunction with non-suicide attacks. Relative to non-suicide terrorism, suicide terrorism results in far
greater numbers of casualties and is increasingly used by terrorist organizations, though non-suicide
events still vastly outnumber suicide attacks (Pape 2003; Piazza 2008). Suicide terrorists, according to
Pape and especially Atran (2003), are not the irrational individuals many have believed; instead, their
13

actions result from strategic thought about the utility of sacrificing themselves in the pursuit of a
political goal.

Causes of suicide terrorism
As noted above, scholars disagree on the relationship of suicide terrorism to its non-suicide
counterpart in terms of root causes; Pape (2003) and Wade and Reiter (2007) argue that the causes of
suicide terrorism are distinct from non-suicide terrorism due to the former’s requirement of selfsacrifice and superior success rates in terms of casualties. Crenshaw (1981) and Moghadam (2006),
however, dispute this notion by arguing that suicide terrorism is an extension of non-suicide, or
“ordinary,” terrorism and thus likely originates through similar channels (Moghadam 2005, p. 6).
Despite this disagreement regarding the causes of suicide relative to non-suicide terrorism,
many scholars can agree that suicide attacks represent an extreme commitment to a cause. Atran
(2003, p. 1534) maintains that an organization’s suicide terrorists, “willfully commit to die spectacularly
for one another and for what is perceived as the common goals of alleviating the community’s onerous
political and social realities.” Similarly, Hoffman and McCormick (2004) interpret suicide terrorism
through the frame of signaling, in which suicide attacks are costly signals meant to convey
determination and commitment. Piazza (2008) further argues that suicide terrorism reveals a sense of
desperation on the part of the terrorist organization as well as a lack of conventional avenues for
achieving goals. el-Sarraj (2005, as cited in Moghadam 2005, p. 17) eloquently captures these ideas with
his statement that, “Politically, suicide bombing is an act of absolute despair.”
In evaluating theoretical causes of suicide terrorism, Moghadam (2005) makes the excellent
point that three different levels of analysis must be explored to account, as fully as possible, for the
potential roots of suicide terrorism. The first level focuses on individual motivations for agreeing to
sacrifice one’s life for a political cause, and this level often involves psychological explanations for such
conduct. The second level involves analysis of terrorist groups that perpetrate suicide terrorism; this
14

level of analysis often invokes explanations related to the utility of suicide attacks for the group’s
success. Finally, the third level, which Moghadam notes directly influences the first and second levels,
concerns the environmental context in which suicide terrorism occurs; these environmental factors,
Piazza (2008) states, can include foreign occupation; economic and social development (or lack thereof);
diversity in terms of ethnicity, religion, culture, language, etc; competition among terrorist groups for
power and influence; particular religious influences among the majority of a state’s population; and a
diverse array of other factors related to the characteristics of the target of terrorism. Moghadam’s
three levels of analysis correspond closely to Ross’s (1993) psychological, rational choice, and structural
causes of terrorism; the individual level of analysis can incorporate psychological and rational choice
theories, while the organizational level is well-suited for rational choice models. The environmental
level is best approached with structural theories of terrorism. These three levels of analysis can also
apply to non-suicide terrorism and are important for disaggregating potential determinants of terrorism
by level of analysis. Though Moghadam argues that all three levels are essential to research that aims to
unearth definitively the roots of terrorist events, he also concedes that analyses focused on only one
level can and have contributed meaningfully to the literature.

Development and suicide terrorism
Though works on the causes of terrorism have focused intermittently on the first and second
levels, others explore the impact of the third, or environmental, level on suicide and non-suicide
terrorism. In many ways, works studying each of these levels of analyses reflect the divide among nonsuicide terrorism researchers on the impact of socioeconomic factors on terrorism. Pape (2005, p. 19),
one of the most influential researchers on suicide attacks, firmly establishes his opinion on the impact of
socioeconomics as a structural explanation with his statement, “Poverty remains a poor indicator of
suicide terrorism.” In accordance with Krueger and Maleckova’s (2003) findings for non-suicide
terrorism, Piazza (2008) finds that literacy and GDP per capita are positively related to domestic and
15

international suicide terrorism. Wade and Reiter (2007) also find that economic development in terms
of energy consumption per capita positively affects the likelihood of suicide attacks. Instead of
socioeconomic factors, some find occupation to be a significant predictor of suicide attacks (Pape 2005;
Piazza 2008). Similar to arguments made above by non-suicide terrorism researchers, some suicide
terrorism scholars assert that in contrast to socioeconomic issues, civil liberties and regime type
significantly relate to suicide attacks, while others argue that these political factors do not influence
suicide terrorism (Atran 2004; Mollica and Dingley 2007; Pape 2003; Wade and Reiter 2007).
Atran (2003) supports Pape’s view that poverty is unrelated to suicide terrorism. Instead, Atran
argues, suicide terrorists are likely to have relatively similar educational and economic backgrounds as
the surrounding population, a trend some researchers have also observed among non-suicide terrorists,
as noted above. However, Atran qualifies this statement by arguing that educated persons who
experience a loss in economic or social status may turn to suicide terrorism; thus underemployment
may positively affect suicide terrorism. Harrison (2003) makes a similar statement regarding education
levels of suicide terrorists; he maintains that people who strive and fail to achieve expected levels of
education and employment may be likely to express their frustrations through suicide attacks. Harrison
(2003, p. 3) argues that suicide terrorism may reflect “pervasive oppressions and social restrictions that
affects not only minority communities that suffer discrimination or a [sic] element of siege, but also
family structure within these communities and specifically the options open to young people of either
sex within them,” seemingly invoking issues of socioeconomic, political, and other grievances. Sprinzak
(2000) also provides some evidence that suicide terrorists hail from disadvantaged backgrounds; he
states that terrorists from groups such as the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), Hamas, and the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LITE) were often unemployed and had humble social backgrounds.
In contrast, Hoffman (2003) states that evidence indicates that well-educated individuals often
comprise Hamas’ leadership; however, he also argues that suicide terrorists need not be sophisticated
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to complete their tasks. Hoffman’s (Shaked n.d., as cited in Hoffman 2003, p. 2-3) source for this
information further states that, “This is a movement not of poor, miserable people but of highly
educated people who are using [the image of] poverty to make the movement more powerful.”
However, terrorist group leaders likely differ socioeconomically from the rank-and-file members of the
organization. For instance, Atran (2003, p. 1535) describes terrorist group leaders as “charismatic,” and
Bueno de Mesquita (2005) provides a compelling argument that though terrorist groups try to screen for
the best-educated and capable recruits, the uneducated and poor likely comprise the majority of the
applicant pool. Shaked’s statement, however, seems to provide a measure of evidence that the Robin
Hood effect discussed above may motivate suicide as well as non-suicide terrorism. Azam (2005, p.178)
formally models the potential impact of the Robin Hood effect on the likelihood of suicide attacks and
asserts that suicide terrorism is “an extreme form of saving” in which altruistic individuals sacrifice
themselves to ensure the continued provision of public goods for future generations. He argues that
high levels of education enhance this effect by allowing well-educated individuals to perceive the need
to preserve the welfare of future generations and thus overwhelm the otherwise deterrent effects of
both education and wealth.
Given Azam’s analysis, suicide attackers in essence believe their expected utility to increase in
death. This notion seems to be supported by the post-attack payments often made to attackers’
families (Krueger and Maleckova 2003; Sprinzak 2000; Pape 2005; Moghadam 2005). One could argue
that the suicide terrorist’s utility increases two-fold in death. If economically disadvantaged, a suicide
attack could bring potentially substantial material gain to one’s family.2 In addition, self-sacrifice for a
political cause indicates that one has given all that he or she can in the pursuit of goals; thus, the suicide
attacker believes he will accrue expected benefits to one’s organization through costly signaling and
contribute to the eventual achievement of political goals. Given this two-pronged view of the results of

2

Krueger and Maleckova note some terrorist organizations may have paid up to $25,000 for past attacks.
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the phenomenon, socioeconomic grievances could ostensibly drive suicide terrorism, though the
terrorist himself may not lack education or suffer from poverty.
While the self-sacrificial aspect of suicide terrorism distinguishes it from non-suicide terrorism, a
review of the literature does not seem to definitively discount the concept that the two forms of
terrorism could arise from similar conditions. For instance, scholars provide evidence both for and
against the relationship of socioeconomic development to non-suicide as well as suicide terrorism, with
little consensus reached on the issues. These socioeconomic factors, such as gross domestic product
(GDP) per capita and education, could invoke issues of both grievances and state capacity as discussed
below. The literature on greed and grievances and state capacity influences studies on domestic
terrorism as well.
Though domestic terrorism differs in certain aspects from other types of civil conflict, scholars
frequently associate issues linked to state capacity, greed, and grievances with terrorist activity. Ross
(1993, p. 325) argues that, “Grievances, both actual and perceived, putative and general, are
hypothesized to be the most important variable,” in terms of the causes of terrorism. Others have also
posited that grievances can result in terrorism (Hamilton 1978; Crenshaw 1981; Gurr 1990). Types of
grievances can include economic, political, ethnic, and social among others (Ross 1993). Abadie (2006,
p. 50) notes that, “Because terrorism is a manifestation of political conflict…poverty and adverse
economic conditions may play an important role explaining terrorism.” Gurr (1970) asserts that
terrorism can be categorized along with other types of civil conflict such as guerrilla warfare and coups
d’etat, thus indicating domestic terrorism as well as the relevance of civil conflict roots to terrorism.
Similarly, Boulden (2009, p. 18) argues that “domestic terrorism tends to be dealt with as part and
parcel of the civil war environment,” and that civil wars can serve as preconditions or precipitants of
terrorism. Sambanis (2008) concurs that terrorism typically occurs in states with histories of civil war.
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Collier (2003) also says that in terms of opportunity, civil wars often provide sanctuaries for terrorists,
who use illegal goods produced by the war for financing.

Greed/Grievances and Civil Conflict
Authors frequently link issues of grievances and state capacity to civil conflict, and since some
authors argue that domestic terrorism closely relates to civil conflict, grievances and state capacity likely
strongly influence domestic terrorism as well; this argument requires an overview of these literatures.
One of the most popular subsets of the civil conflict literature concerns the impact of “greed” and
“grievances” on rebel groups’ incentives to engage the state in conflict. The greed theory argues that
civil conflict occurs when rebel groups take advantage of the opportunity to form and function; such
opportunities could include natural resource extractions, un-policed terrain, and foreign support (Fearon
and Laitin 2003; Murshed and Tadjoeddin 2009) Grievance theorists maintain that rebel groups initiate
conflict due to grievances with the state, such as ethnic dominance, income inequality, and political
repression (Sen 1973; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). The long history of greed and grievances in political
science has generated numerous variations on these two theories and their potential relationships with
civil conflict. Relative deprivation is considered a variant of the grievance literature and argues that
rebellion is generated when citizens perceive a gap between their expectations of living conditions and
reality (Gurr 1970; Brush 1996).
A related strain of the grievance literature states that inequality, bred of structural inequality in
terms of land or other goods distributions, motivates civil conflict (Russett 1964; Midlarski 1988).
Hirschman and Rothschild (1973) explain that violence stemming from inequality can approximate a
traffic jam; if, after two lanes have remained stalled for some time, one lane begins moving, both lanes
feel a measure of hope for the future. However, if one lane remains stalled long after the other begins
moving, that lane’s drivers develop anger and may resort to illegal measures to recoup losses and gain
justice. Stewart (2000) notes differences between horizontal inequality and vertical inequality, in which
19

the former defines differences between groups and the latter indicates class differences in ethnically
homogenous societies. Other researchers have argued that greed is the determining factor of rebellion;
according to this literature, rebels act as criminals motivated by economic gain (Grossman 1999; Collier
and Hoeffler 2004).
Collier and Hoeffler’s (2004) seminal work regarding greed and grievances explains that though
rebel groups likely require both opportunity (greed) and grievances to take the drastic step of conflict
with the state, the two theories are not necessarily equally weighted in their influence. The authors
offer several proxies of both greed and grievances, and their empirical results indicate that greed
models do perform better than grievance models, though a greed model that incorporates robust
grievance variables (i.e. ethnic dominance) performs best. Interestingly, the authors note that certain
indicators could function as both greed and grievance proxies; for instance, although Collier and Hoeffler
use low forgone income as a proxy for opportunity to engage in rebel activity, low income could also
signify a grievance. In an interesting contrast, Thyne (2006) studies the role of education in affecting
civil war; while Collier and Hoeffler categorize male secondary school enrollment as a greed proxy that
signifies abnormally low forgone income, Thyne argues that male enrollment represents a potential
grievance. Thyne asserts that low enrollment indicates poor state investment in education, which limits
social cohesion, equality, employment, life expectancy, and other human development factors. Of
greatest import to my argument is Thyne’s finding that male enrollment does significantly relate to civil
conflict onset; given Collier and Hoeffler’s evidence that the same variable, utilized as a proxy for greed
in their study, is significantly linked to conflict, the true role of male enrollment in generating civil
conflict seems as yet unknown.
Similar to Collier and Hoffler, Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) influential work on insurgency indicates
their preference for opportunity explanations for insurgent activity as opposed to grievance. Though
they note that civil conflicts are likely to produce grievances, Fearon and Laitin maintain that their
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empirical results demonstrate the superior explanatory power of opportunities, particularly weak state
capacity, as opposed to broadly-held grievances as conditions favoring the onset of insurgency.
Other authors argue that grievances are more influential than greed in motivating civil conflict.
Regan and Norton (2005) provide a compelling explanation of the innate distinctions between relative
deprivation and inequality as grievances, and their findings provide support to the theoretical notion
that these grievance nuances affect rebellion. The authors note that, “Resource distribution–as
indicated by the extent of political discrimination–is one of the strongest predictors of the onset of
violent forms of antistate activity” (Regan and Norton, 2005, p. 333). Furthermore, Regan and Norton
note that exploitable resources such as diamonds and opiates lack the relationship with civil conflict
typically posited by greed theorists. Instead, Regan and Norton suggest that easily extractable resources
may aid in the funding of ongoing civil conflicts, rather than onset.
Murshed and Tadjoeddin (2009) also express skepticism of pure or even majority greed motives
in civil conflict; they argue that though greed may play a role in sustaining civil conflict, grievances likely
play a larger role in causing such conflicts, as Regan and Norton (2005) assert. Like Collier and Hoeffler
(2004), Murshed and Tadjoeddin feel that greed and grievance are likely complimentary, rather than
competitive, schools of thought. Furthermore, Murshed and Tadjoeddin (2009, p. 108) express their
belief that “Neither the presence of greed or grievance is sufficient for the outbreak of violent conflict,
something which requires institutional breakdown which we describe as the failure of the social
contract.” The authors assert that the state’s failure to maintain its social contract with citizens (often
manifested as widespread poverty) underlies the conclusions of greed theorists and creates the
collective action, based on grievances, needed to generate conflict. Thus, the greed and grievances
literature can intertwine closely with the state capacity literature, which further describes the unique
role the state plays in causing or preventing civil conflict.

State Capacity and Civil Conflict
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The state capacity literature can be thought of as a complement to the greed and grievance
literature regarding civil conflict, and thus I also review this literature for connections to domestic
terrorism. While the greed and grievance literature primarily investigates the motives of rebels in
engaging in conflict, the state capacity literature examines the role of the state in the onset, duration,
and outcome of such conflicts. Many scholars share the idea that civil conflict is a function of state
capacity, defined as the ability of the government to effectively control the population, activities, and
resources under its auspices (Tilly 2003). The conclusion Regan and Norton (2005) reach regarding the
role of the state in producing conflict is one shared by Fearon and Laitin (2003) concerning insurgency.
Fearon and Laitin attribute insurgency to weak state capacity, as indicated by poverty, instability, and
large state size; the authors argue that these factors result in a government incapable of strong,
comprehensive administration or financing, thus providing breeding grounds for insurgents.
Fearon (2005), Humphreys (2005), and de Soysa and Neumayer (2007), concur with Murshed
and Tadjoeddin’s (2009) statement that the relationship between natural resources and civil conflict
may actually demonstrate a relationship between weak state capacity and civil conflict; often states that
rely heavily on natural resource extracts, particularly oil, fail to develop a strong bureaucracy, including
extensive tax systems and public goods (Fearon 2005). Such failure to develop a strong administration
leaves the state vulnerable to rebellious movements, especially during times of economic hardship
(Fearon and Laitin 2003). Hegre et al. (2001) and Mueller and Weede (1990) find that civil war is most
common among transitioning states and anocracies rather than stable democracies or autocracies due
to the inherently weak capacity of these states; established democracies likely provide greater
opportunities for peaceful airing of grievances, while strong autocracies use repression to silence
protest. Buhaug (2006) notes that while grievances may prompt groups to rebel, the degree of state
capacity can determine the type of conflict initiated. Specifically, weak states in terms of stability,
economic capacity, and resource dependence experience higher rates of coups and revolutions as
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opposed to strong governments, which typically experience more threats of secession. Buhaug further
finds that population size and ethnic fractionalization are only related to secessionist conflicts, while the
relationship between regime type and civil conflict posited by Hegre et al. (2001) is sustained only for
non-secessionist conflicts.
Finally, Fjelde and de Soysa (2009) refine the state capacity literature by distinguishing the
various measures used to approximate state capacity into three main pathways: coercion, co-optation,
and cooperation. They find, in accordance with Thyne (2006), Levi (2006), Buhaug (2006), and Azam
(2001), that co-optation, in the form of government spending for the purpose of the provision of public
goods, is significantly related to civil peace. Thus, their findings indicate that strong state capacity in
terms of public spending pacifies the population, leading to fewer outbreaks of conflict; furthermore,
their argument regarding co-optation is closely aligned with the grievances arguments discussed above,
in which government provision of public goods soothes public grievances, leading to peace.
A review of the literature reveals close relationships between greed and grievances as well as
state capacity and the risk of civil conflict. As noted above, state capacity has been posited as the
intervening factor in the supposed relationship between greed and civil conflict. In addition, a strong,
effective government can reduce grievances among the population through investment in public goods,
diminishing the risk of civil conflict. Consequently, domestic terrorism closely relates to civil conflict
issues such as grievances and state capacity, particularly in terms of socioeconomic issues.
In addition, one issue that has received limited attention in the terrorism literature in terms of
structural explanations but that has demonstrated a relationship with both intra- and interstate conflict
is gender inequality in terms of socioeconomic development. Socioeconomic gender inequality can
invoke issues of state capacity and grievances as well. As Coleman (2004, p. 82) notes, “Gender
disparities hit women and girls the hardest, but ultimately all of society pays a price for them.”
Correspondingly, the opening quote of this paper, according to Coleman (2004, p. 90-91), reflects the
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fact that, “As GNP plunged from $25,000 in 1984 to roughly $8,500 today, more Saudis are wondering
why half the country’s human capital should be so severely handicapped.”

Gender Inequality and Conflict
The terrorism literature largely veils references to a gender gap in the context of possible
motivations for female suicide bombers (O’Rourke 2009). Some scholars posit that females join terrorist
organizations and volunteer for suicide missions in order to bring about more equitable state policies in
terms of gender (Caizza 2001; Von Knop 2007); this theory of course recalls Azam’s (2005) theory
regarding the altruistic suicide terrorist and centers on psychological explanations for terrorism. Others
dismiss the idea of feminist motivations for female suicide bombers, instead naming numerous other
individual-level incentives for committing such acts (Bloom 2005; Ness 2005).
Despite the uncertainty of the relevance of gender equality to female suicide terrorists, others
assert that gender gaps are associated with both international and civil conflict, thus providing other
potential pathways from gender inequality to terrorism. Caprioli (2000), Caprioli and Boyer (2001), and
Regan and Paskeviciute (2003) find that measures of gender inequality are positively linked to
international conflict. Using fertility rates and female political participation as proxies for gender
discrimination disfavoring women, Caprioli (2000) argues that women can promote international peace
through either biological or constructivist concepts or theory relating domestic inequality to
international violence. The biologically-based theory asserts that women are biologically predisposed to
peace through maternal capabilities and instincts, thus predicting that increased female political
representation will reduce international violence. Women are also thought to reduce international
violence through socially-constructed gender roles, which condition them to take on roles as caretakers
and peacemakers. Both of these theories, Caprioli states, indicate that equal inclusion of women in
social, economic, and political spheres will promote international peace. Finally, Caprioli notes that
domestic inequalities of all natures, but especially gender, are thought to influence militaristic decisions
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in the international arena. She asserts that her finding of a positive relationship between interstate
conflict and gender inequality is particularly supportive of the domestic-international inequality theory,
though such a finding could also indicate support of either the biological or constructivist theories.
The relationship between gender gaps and conflict also applies to intrastate conflict, according
to studies conducted by Caprioli (2005), Melander (2005), and Bussman (2007). Melander’s work largely
utilizes Caprioli’s linkage of biological and constructivist arguments to gender gaps to explain his finding
that gender inequality in terms of political, social, and economic status increases civil conflict. He uses
female state leadership, percentage of female parliament members, and the ratio of male-to-female
education level to proxy gender inequality, finding that while female leadership is insignificant,
increased female parliamentary participation and a narrowing gender gap in education significantly and
negatively relate to the level of civil conflict. Using the same proxies for gender inequality as in her work
on international conflict, Caprioli (2005) finds that gender inequality increases the risk of intrastate
conflict onset. Additionally, Caprioli finds that increasing differences between male and female
secondary school enrollment also positively relates to civil conflict. She posits that gender equality on
all levels is a precursor to structural inequality, which is characterized by norms of violence. Also,
structural inequality facilitates ethnic rebellion, which is mobilized by calls to strict, mutually exclusive
gender roles reinforcing the inferiority of women to men. These, Caprioli asserts, are the pathways from
gender inequality to intrastate conflict.
Bussman (2007) offers a different perspective of the nature of the link between gender
inequality and civil conflict. She asserts that narrowing gender gaps in political, social, economic, and
health indicators may directly reduce civil conflict or indirectly promote peace through increasing good
governance and development. Other authors also link gender inequality to low overall development
and reduced economic growth. Caizza (2001, p. 2), for example, argues that, “Across the globe, when
women have more rights and equality, national standards of living also rise–life expectancy is higher,
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incomes and education levels are higher, and birthrates are lower.” Coleman (2004, p. 80-81) states
that reductions in gender gaps “have benefitted society at large, improving living standards, increasing
social entrepreneurship, and attracting foreign direct investment.” Improvements in women’s
education also lead to lower fertility and child mortality rates and higher rates of women’s income
(Klaus 2000; Coleman 2004). Microfinance devoted to women also benefits the general society and
promotes development because women tend to use microfinance opportunities to invest in their
families and communities rather than themselves (Coleman 2004). Coleman points out that those world
regions that have achieved the greatest gains in gender equality in education have also experienced the
greatest economic and social growth. Similarly, Klasen (2002) finds that gender inequality in education
and employment reduces economic growth, while Hill and King (1995) find that low female-to-male
school enrollment ratios also lead to lower levels of GDP per capita. Though I study the direct effect of
gender inequality on terrorism, these studies suggest that gender inequality may also indirectly affect
terrorism through decreases in development and economic growth, presenting an interesting avenue
for future research.
Bussman (2007, p. 1) also asserts that inclusion of women in education and employment
increases competition, thus “as a result of the competitive environment corruption and rent-seeking is
inhibited improving the quality of governance.” Empirically, Bussman finds that increases in female life
expectancy, literacy, and education directly reduce the risk of civil conflict onset. When controlling for
GDP per capita, female labor participation significantly and negatively affects conflict onset. Finally,
Bussman finds that female political participation indirectly reduces civil conflict through promotion of
good governance and development. Thus, according to Caprioli (2005), Melander (2005), and Bussman
(2007), gender inequality effectively increases civil conflict onset and intensity, though as Melander
notes, the exact causal pathway from gender inequality to conflict is still unclear.
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While the evidence cited above regarding gender equality and conflict reduction on both
domestic and international fronts does not fully reflect the relationship gender inequality may have with
terrorism, one can argue that the finding of a positive relationship between gender inequality and civil
conflict demonstrates the relevance of such studies to terrorism. However, I argue that the link
between gender gaps and terrorism is not necessarily indicative of the biological or constructivist
theories of women’s nature as proposed by Caprioli (2005) and Melander (2005), since these arguments
seem complicated by normative issues associated with notions of gender; both the biological and
constructivist arguments essentially assert that across the world, women are peaceful and men are
violent, categorizations that seem to hinge on stereotypical speculations rather than comprehensive
individual or state-level research into the dispositions of either gender. Bussman’s (2007) assertion that
certain proxies of gender inequality indirectly influence conflict through good governance and
development is more persuasive, but she provides little explanation for the more intriguing findings of
direct relationships between other proxies and conflict reduction. Bussman (2007, p. 1) states that,
“The results of the present study support the notion that improving the situation for women with regard
to more political representation, economic participation, better access to health and education
improves state capacity and good governance.” This statement invokes one of the key concepts I use to
formulate my argument on the association between gender inequality and terrorism: state capacity.
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Gender Inequality and Terrorism
I study a structural explanation of terrorism such as gender inequality for two reasons. First, as
Ross (1993) notes, structural models of terrorism are easier to test than psychological or rational choice
models – structural models utilize country-level data that is more available and reliable than the
individual or group-level data required of psychological or rational choice models. The second, and
perhaps most important, reason is that structural explanations for terrorism may be easier to address
policy-wise than other types of explanations – for instance, the state can more easily modify social
spending and legislation than individual psychologies and organizational tactics.
I explore gender inequality as opposed to other possible forms of inequality because I feel that
gender inequality represents the broadest form of discrimination in a given society; males and females
each comprise roughly half the population in every state, and therefore gender discrimination
effectively handicaps half the society’s human capital. While other types of inequality such as ethnic
and religious discrimination also likely affect terrorism, I argue that gender inequality represents the
largest of such possible forms of discrimination and is therefore most likely to affect terrorism directly.
Given the evidence cited above that both grievances and state capacity affect civil conflict as
well as the evidence that terrorism stems from desire to enact change due to socioeconomic grievances
and altruism, I argue that gender inequality spawns terrorist attacks through both weak state capacity
and grievances. I argue that gender parity can function as a public good; as noted above, gender
equality leads to overall development in states and promotes good governance. Gender inequality,
however, displays indifference to or oppression of roughly half a state’s population, stunting growth and
good governance and, more directly, signifying state illegitimacy. Similar to Hirschman’s (1973) analogy
of inequality and stalled traffic, if one gender develops disproportionately, the dire ramifications of such
unequal development could propel a society into violent action against the entity thought to allow such
disparate growth. By failing to provide gender equality, which contributes to the well-being not only of
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the gender experiencing discrimination but also the entire population, the state signals a lack of care
regarding its citizens’ welfare and therefore loses legitimacy. Gender inequality in socioeconomic
indicators particularly aggravates grievances, hinders development, and demonstrates weak state
capacity, given the state’s ability to directly influence many aspects of socioeconomic welfare through
legislation, social spending, and other government initiatives. Failure to maintain gender equality thus
represents the state’s failure to provide a public good. Such broad discrimination as gender inequality
demonstrates illegitimacy, creating the perception of weak state capacity and generating widespread
grievances among the population.
These grievances suggest that terrorism created by gender inequality is generated not only by
the gender directly handicapped, but also by the society in general. The fact that gender inequality
burdens society as a whole can account for the varied socioeconomic backgrounds of terrorists –both
genders and citizens of all backgrounds can recognize a state’s capacity or lack thereof to provide
equally for its citizens, thus invoking both the Robin Hood effect as well as the notion of the altruistic
terrorist. Essentially, the state’s inability or disinclination to provide for the equitable welfare of its
citizens signifies illegitimacy as a manifestation of weak state capacity and results in widespread
grievances among the population; citizens then turn to terrorism to protest the state’s illegitimacy and
enact change. As Ross (1993) notes, addressing the structural causes of terrorism such as gender
inequality should reduce the risk of experiencing such acts. Thus, the state’s continued provision of
gender parity as a public good should reduce grievances, enhance the perception of strong state
capacity, and therefore deter domestic terrorist acts.
In order to study the potential relationship between socioeconomic gender inequality and
terrorism in terms of structural causes related to state capacity and grievances, I analyze gender
inequality among socioeconomic indicators thought to influence terrorism. While there are several
possible socioeconomic indicators to explore in reference to terrorism, I choose to study gender
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inequality in terms of education, labor participation, and life expectancy. Each of these indicators is
important at both individual and state levels. All improve the human experience and allow for both
greater individual opportunities and contributions to national development. Education improves
intellectual capacity, individual decision-making, and the ability to contribute to society through gainful
employment. Labor participation allows for individual and family care as well as contributions to the
national economy by improving productivity. Life expectancy reflects both individual and national
health conditions and affects the ability to contribute to society by gaining education and employment.
The state is uniquely positioned to enhance each of these indicators through social spending, welfare
programs, legislation, and other government-directed initiatives in broad enough strokes as to influence
the general population. Therefore, the state assumes the predominant responsibility in guiding the
educational, health, and economic welfare of the majority of its citizens and thus is also the
predominant recipient of resentment when it does not provide benefits at relatively equal rates for both
genders, since such discrimination reflects poor state capacity and illegitimacy, leading to widespread
grievances. In addition, people of age to commit terrorist attacks are the ones most likely to develop
grievances based on gender inequality among these socioeconomic indicators.
Due to the nature of the theoretical arguments developed above and the heretofore poor
representation of domestic relative to international terrorism analyses in the literature, I restrict my
analysis to domestic terrorism. In addition, given that terrorist groups often evolve from domestic to
international terrorism, I feel that an analysis that closely examines the origins of domestic terrorist
activities could uniquely inform the international terrorism roots literature as well3.
Furthermore, in contrast to some research noted above, I argue that the gender gap can explain
the use of suicide as well as non-suicide domestic terrorist attacks through the causal mechanisms of
state capacity and grievances. Some scholars argue that suicide terrorism is, rather than a unique
3

See Addison and Murshed (2002) for further discussion of the spillover of domestic to international terrorism.
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phenomenon, an extreme augmentation of non-suicide terrorism used during times of desperation to
signal a fierce sense of commitment to a political cause. Consequently, the same causes that contribute
to non-suicide domestic terrorism are also likely to drive suicide terrorism. I concur with Moghadam
(2006) and Crenshaw (1981) that suicide terrorism is an extension of non-suicide terrorism, rather than
a uniquely-occurring event. Therefore, I argue that though suicide terrorism reflects a greater
magnitude of commitment to a cause through self-sacrifice, suicide and non-suicide terrorism share
similar causes. As such, I expect that socioeconomic gender inequality increases not only non-suicide
but also suicide terrorist attacks, through the same causal mechanisms of weak state capacity and
widespread grievances. Therefore, I expect that increases in socioeconomic gender inequality will
provoke suicide as well as non-suicide terrorism, as the state demonstrates its illegitimacy through its
inability or unwillingness to see to the needs of the population equitably, and such weak state capacity
generates widespread grievances.
Thus, my hypotheses are as follows:
Hypothesis 1: Large gender gaps in education will increase the risk of non-suicide, suicide, and
total domestic terrorist attacks.
Hypothesis 2: Large gender gaps in labor participation will increase the risk of non-suicide,
suicide, and total domestic terrorist attacks.
Hypothesis 3: Large gender gaps in life expectancy will increase the risk of non-suicide, suicide,
and total domestic terrorist attacks.
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Data and Methods
In order to assess the risk of terrorist attacks, I employ logistic and zero-inflated negative
binomial (ZINB) regressions in Stata 10 with the country-year as the unit of analysis. I run all of the
models with robust standard errors clustered by country-code to account for heteroskedasticity (Chen,
Ender, Mitchell, and Wells 2003). Given the unique nature of terrorism data, typically over-dispersed
count data with non-negative integers, many researchers utilize negative binomial or Poisson models to
evaluate the number of terrorist attacks (Krueger and Maleckova 2003; Krueger and Laitin 2007; Freytag
et al. 2009). I use logistic regression as the first step in determining the effect of gender inequality on
the overall risk of terrorism; however, given that terrorism data also present many observations of zeros
which are likely to have different causes, I also employ ZINB regression, which Burgoon (2006) and Wade
and Reiter (2007) utilize as well in their studies on terrorism.
Using ZINB, one essentially predicts that there are two distinct groups of “zeros”; one group of
zeros that experiences conditions thought to cause terrorism, but does not experience it, and one group
that is virtually always a zero group because they do not exhibit conditions thought to influence
terrorism. This type of regression presents two different sets of estimates; the first stage is a logit
model that predicts the probability of remaining in the “always zero” group, or never experiencing the
dependent variable, while the second stage is a negative binomial model that estimates the effect on
the count of the dependent variable. As such, the signs for coefficients should differ between the two
stages if the coefficients are significant –for instance, if a variable exhibits a positive, significant
coefficient in the logit stage, the same variable’s coefficient should be negative and significant or
positive and insignificant in the negative binomial stage. If the coefficients for a variable are significant
and the signs are the same for both stages of the ZINB model, there is a problem with the data or the
model’s specification, since this indicates that a variable has a paradoxical influence on the dependent
variable. In addition, the first set of logistic regressions I use predicts the probability of experiencing
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terrorism, while the logit stages of the ZINB models predict the probability of never experiencing
terrorism – therefore, the signs of significant coefficients should also differ between these two models.
In addition, ZINB regressions give a Vuong Test option, which indicates whether ZINB is
preferable to standard negative binomial regression for the given model (Greene 1994). Each of the
models tested below present significant Vuong statistics, indicating the superior suitability of ZINB;
therefore, I use ZINB rather than standard negative binomial regressions to analyze the risk of terrorist
activities, which represents a more refined logit model due to the assumption of different causes for
zeros. Non-suicide and suicide terrorism have a correlation of .85, which indicates both that non-suicide
and suicide attacks often occur jointly and that causes for both forms of terrorism may be similar across
most cases, as Crenshaw (1981) and Moghadam (2005, 2006) suggest. Summary statistics and a
correlation matrix for the independent and control variables are reported in the Appendix.
Due to terrorism data limitations, the temporal span for the total terrorism and non-suicide
terrorism models ranges from 1998-2009, while the suicide terrorism models include years 1999-2009.
The models cover 143 countries. While a longer time span for all of the models would be best in terms
of generalizability and possible policy implications derived from the data, the quality of terrorism data is
generally poor with most datasets (Piazza 2008). Abadie (2006, p. 51) notes the limitations of “quality
and adequacy of available data on terrorist casualties and incidents,” and Wade and Reiter (2007) argue
that empirical studies of suicide terrorism are still in early stages. Piazza (2008) states that suicide
attacks comprise just over 3% of the total number of domestic terrorist attacks from 1968-2005. During
same time period, nearly 7% of terror groups used suicide tactics, and all of these also used non-suicide
attacks. Wade and Reiter (2007) state that international suicide terrorism occurs in only 2% of the
country years in their study ranging from 1980-2003. In the RDWTI dataset used here, suicide attacks
account for less than 5% of total domestic terrorist events. According to the RDWTI dataset, there were
less than thirty total non-suicide domestic terrorist attacks prior to 1998, whereas from 1998 there was
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a maximum of no less than 100 observations per year. This is not surprising, since the dataset is the
result of a merger between an international terrorism dataset and a domestic dataset that only began
recording incidents in 1998; however, domestic cases prior to 1998 have begun to be recorded (RAND
Corporation 2010). Setting the time frame to 1998-2009 for total terrorism and non-suicide terrorism
thus incorporates the vast majority of available cases, and the limited time span has precedent in other
terrorism studies (Abadie 2006; Piazza 2008). The limitations of this time frame in terms of policy
implications are discussed further in the concluding section.
In addition, RDWTI lists no domestic suicide terrorist attacks before 1998 and only three attacks
total in 1998. Given that ZINB regressions with education inequality as the explanatory variable require
an inordinate number of iterations for the years 1998-2009, I have pushed the time frame forward by
one year for all of the suicide models to 1999-2009. As with non-suicide attacks, this time frame also
incorporates the vast majority of suicide attack observations, and the limitations of this time span will
be discussed in the concluding section as well. Figures 1, 2, and 3 below illustrate total, non-suicide, and
suicide terrorism, respectively, for the corresponding time frames used in the models below to
graphically demonstrate the distribution of terrorism over time. Iraq is also excluded from all terrorism
models as the country is an extreme outlier for both non-suicide and suicide attacks.
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Variables
Dependent variables
Total domestic terrorism: I use the RAND Corporation’s RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism
Incidents (RDWTI) to generate data on domestic non-suicide and suicide terrorism (RAND Corporation
2010). From the original output of individual, aggregate cases of domestic terrorism, I construct a count
variable of total domestic terrorist attacks by country-year for use in ZINB models and a binary
dependent variable taking a value of “1” if the count of total terrorist attacks is greater than zero in a
country-year and “0” if otherwise for logistic models.
Non-suicide domestic terrorism: Using the RTWDI database, I also generate a count variable by
country-year for non-suicide domestic terrorist attacks for ZINB models. For logistic models, I construct
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a binary dependent variable with values of “1” if the count of non-suicide domestic terrorist events is
greater than zero in a country-year, and “0” if otherwise.
Suicide domestic terrorism: Using RDWTI, I also create a count variable by country-year for
suicide terrorist events for ZINB models. For logistic models, I generate a binary dependent variable
with “1” as the value if the country-year count of suicide terrorist events is greater than zero and “0” if
otherwise.

Independent variables
Education gender gapt-1: To construct this variable, I use the World Bank’s World Development
Indicators (WDI) 2010 to obtain the annual difference of male and female secondary school enrollment.
The male and female gross enrollment variables are each given as, “the ratio of total enrollment,
regardless of age, to the population of the age group that officially corresponds to the level of education
shown” (World Bank 2010); the ratios may therefore result in values over 100. Given the large amount
of missing data which limits observations by a quarter in the models, I use interpolated enrollment
values to construct the gap; the missing data appears to be systematically missing for every other year
or so rather than several sequential years for most countries during the years studied, so the use of
interpolated values should approximate true values with a fair degree of accuracy. Male enrollment
typically exceeds female enrollment (Tong 2009); therefore, since I construct this variable by subtracting
female from male values, positive coefficients in the first set of logistic regressions will support my
hypothesis, while negative coefficients in the logit stage of the ZINB models will also provide support.
The variable is lagged by one year to account for possible endogeneity with terrorism.
Labor participation gender gapt-1: I again use WDI 2010 to obtain the annual difference of male
and female labor participation. The male and female variables are each defined as the labor
participation rate of each gender as a percentage of that gender’s total population, ages 15 and older.
Male labor participation also typically exceeds female participation (Tong 2009); therefore, since I
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construct this variable by subtracting female from male values, positive coefficients in the first set of
logistic regressions will again support my hypothesis, while negative coefficients in the logit stage of the
ZINB models provide further support. This variable is lagged by one year.
Life expectancy gender gapt-1: Finally, I create the annual difference of female and male life
expectancy using WDI’s indicators for male and female life expectancy at birth given as years. Since
female life expectancy typically exceeds that of males, I construct this gap by subtracting male from
female values (Dollar and Gatti 1999). As such, positive coefficients in the first set of logistic regressions
will support my third hypothesis, while negative coefficients in the logit stage of the ZINB models will
also support the third hypothesis. This variable is lagged by one year to account for possible
endogeneity.

Control variables
Because terrorism studies have identified a number of factors that may significantly relate to
non-suicide and suicide terrorism and could systematically bias the estimated impact of gender
inequality, I control for the most common of these variables:
Polityt-1: Some studies have demonstrated a significant relationship between regime type and
terrorism. Some authors argue that democracies are typical targets of terrorism, while others have
researched the idea that anocracies are more likely to be targeted (Pape 2003; Wade and Reiter 2007).
Therefore, I control for regime type using the Polity IV Annual Time-Series dataset, which gives an
annual state polity score ranging from -10 to 10 (Marshall and Jaggers 2009). I use the variable Polity2
from the Polity IV dataset, which recodes missing values from -66,-77, and -88 as 0. The variable is
lagged by one year.
Polity squared: This squared term controls for a possible non-monotonic relationship between
regime time and terrorism.
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Civil conflictt-1: Since research indicates that domestic terrorism can be considered a
manifestation of civil conflict, I control for the impact civil conflict may have on the risk of terrorism.
This variable is provided by the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) and represents civil conflicts with
twenty-five or more battle deaths (Gleditsch et al., 2002). Harbom and Wallensteen (2009) update the
data to 2008. This variable is lagged by one year to control for endogeneity.
Ethnic Fractionalization: Some argue that ethnic fractionalization may increase the risk of civil
conflict and terrorism (Hirschman 1973; Regan and Norton 2005; Ross 1993; Crenshaw 1981). I control
for this factor using data from Fearon and Laitin (2003). Their data on ethnic fractionalization ends in
1999, and since I do not expect ethnic fractionalization to vary greatly year-to-year, I extrapolate a
country’s 1999 value for subsequent years.
Ethnic fractionalization squared: Ethnic fractionalization may also have a non-monotic
relationship with terrorism, in which states that are very ethnically homogenous or heterogeneous are
less likely to experience terrorism. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Elbadawi (1999) observe such a nonmonotonic effect for ethnic fractionalization and the risk of civil conflict. Therefore, I also include a
squared term for ethnic fractionalization.
Muslim population: Some researchers note that Islam can be a significant factor leading to
increased terrorism (Wade and Reiter 2007; Piazza 2008). I control for this factor using Fearon and
Laitin’s variable for the annual percentage of Muslim population per country (2003). Again, I
extrapolate the 1999 value for all countries through 2009, since I do not expect this variable to
experience significant year-to-year variation.
GDPt-1: As noted above, scholars vigorously debate the supposed impact of development on
terrorism; some assert that development decreases terrorism, while others argue that terrorism
increases or has no relationship with terrorism. Therefore, I control for the potential impact of
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development using annual GDP per capita. This information is provided by WDI 2010, and the variable is
log-transformed and lagged by one year (World Bank 2010).
Populationt-1: Given the strain on resources and increased pool of potential terrorists presented
by large populations, I also control for the impact population may have on terrorism. This variable is
defined as annual total population and is provided by WDI 2010 (World Bank 2010). This variable is also
log-transformed and lagged by one year.
Lagged dependent variables: I lag the count variables of terrorist events by one year and include
them as control variables in the corresponding models to control for time interval dependency.
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Results
Total terrorism
Logistic regressions
I first examine the relationship between gender inequality and total domestic terrorism to
determine the most general association between the two. The results of logistic regressions to assess
gender inequality and the risk of total terrorism are reported in Table 1 below. The signs for all gender
gap variables are in the predicted positive directions – greater gender inequality leads to a greater risk
of experiencing domestic terrorism, as Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3 predict. The coefficients are highly
statistically significant for both education and life expectancy gaps, while the labor gap coefficient is
statistically significant at the .1 level using a one-tailed test.
Population increases the risk of terrorism with high statistical significance in all three models as
expected, and coefficients for previous civil conflict are positive and generally statistically significant for
all of the models, indicating that a history of civil conflict does increase the risk of terrorism, as
predicted. Though the ethnic fractionalization variables are generally statistically insignificant in the
logistic regressions, the variables do exhibit a non-monotonic effect relationship with terrorism in all of
the models, as Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and Elbadawi (1999) predict. Coefficients for polity are
positive and generally statistically significant for the models, and the squared polity term coefficient is
negative yet statistically insignificant for all of the models, which somewhat supports a non-monotonic
relationship between regime type and terrorism, as Pape (2003) asserts. GDP per capita positively
relates to the risk of terrorism in each of the models, though the relationships are statistically
insignificant; these results weakly support the conclusions of authors such as Krueger and Maleckova
(2003) in terms of the relationship between development and terrorism. Muslim population as well
increases the risk of terrorism, though this relationship is also statistically insignificant in all three
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models, which lends weak support to the claims of Wade and Reiter (2007) and Piazza (2008). The
lagged dependent variable is also positive yet statistically insignificant in the three models.

Table 1
Logistic regressions, Total Terrorism 1998-2009
Education gap
Labor gap

Model 1
.005
(.002)**
-

Model 2

Model 3

-

-

.013
(.009)

-

.132
(.042)**
.073
.077
.079
Lagged dependent variable
(.065)
(.068)
(.067)
.542
.523
.551
Total pop
(.080)***
(.076)***
(.079)***
.815
.716
.827
Previous civil conflict
(.398)*
(.408)
(.387)*
2.349
3.168
2.451
Ethnic fractionalization
(2.061)
(2.011)
(2.036)
Squared ethnic
-3.465
-4.490
-3.410
fractionalization
(2.200)
(2.214)*
(2.195)
.206
.159
.210
Polity
(.100)*
(.096)
(.101)*
-.006
-.005
-.007
Squared polity
(.004)
(.004)
(.004)
.101
.009
.040
GDP per capita
(.090)
(.090)
(.084)
.005
.000
.005
% Muslim pop
(.004)
(.005)
(.004)
Constant
-12.781***
-11.467***
-12.845***
N
1642
1698
1695
Clusters
143
143
143
Wald chi2
125.88
134.33
129.32
p>chi2
0.000
0.000
0.000
Pseudo R2
.262
.266
.272
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Observations clustered by country. *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001
Life expectancy gap

-

-

Zero-inflated negative binomial regressions
To further examine the influence of gender inequality on the risk of terrorism, I use ZINB
regressions for all of the gender gap variables. Results of ZINB regressions are reported below in Table
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2. Overall, the models support the logistic regression results reported above. Results for the logit stage
of the education gap model indicate that large gaps reduce the probability of being in the “always zero”
group, or never experiencing terrorism, with high statistical significance, which is supportive of the prior
logistic results and my first hypothesis. The negative binomial stage of the model indicates increasing
education gaps reduce the count of terrorist events, though the relationship is statistically insignificant.
For the labor gap model, the signs for coefficients in both stages of the model are in the expected
directions (positive for the negative binomial stage and negative for the logit stage), but the coefficients
are statistically insignificant at conventional levels. Results of the life expectancy model are similar to
that of the education model and support the logistic regression results above. The negative binomial
stage of the model indicates that large life expectancy gaps reduce the count of terrorist events, though
the relationship is statistically insignificant; the logit stage, however, demonstrates that gender
inequality in life expectancy reduces the probability of never experiencing terrorism with high statistical
significance, as I predict in Hypothesis 3.
In terms of the control variables, most produce similar effects across the three models.
Coefficients for population are highly statistically significant with the expected positive signs for the
negative binomial stages and negative signs for the logit stages of all three models; as predicted, large
populations increase the risk of terrorism. Previous civil conflict is positive and highly statistically
significant in all three models for increasing the count of terrorist events, as expected. Ethnic
fractionalization does not reach statistical significance in any of the models, though the squared term is
statistically significant for the negative binomial stages for all three models; there appears to be an
inverted-U effect for ethnic fractionalization in each of the models, as predicted. Polity and its squared
term are statistically insignificant in all three models and exhibit a non-monotonic relationship in nearly
all stages of the models; though not a significant relationship, the relationship between regime type and
terrorism most often appears as an inverted-U, as some authors predict. GDP per capita as well as
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Muslim populations positively affect the count of terrorist events as predicted in the literature, though
these relationships are statistically insignificant. The lagged dependent variable is highly statistically
significant for increasing the risk of experiencing terrorism and the count of terrorist events.
In essence, the overall results of the logistic and ZINB regressions indicate that large education
and life expectancy gender gaps significantly increase the risk of experiencing domestic terrorism, as I
predict in Hypothesis 1 and 3, respectively. The logistic regression results for the labor participation
gender gap model support Hypothesis 2, though the labor gap variable does not reach conventional
levels of statistical significance using a two-tailed test. ZINB regression results for the labor gap model
do not appear to provide similar support for my second hypothesis.
In further logit and ZINB tests, I disaggregate domestic terrorism into non-suicide and suicide
terrorism. There are significant benefits to this disaggregation. Perhaps most importantly, empirical
terrorism tests that distinguish between suicide and non-suicide terrorism are fairly rare, and among
those that do, the studies focus on either international or aggregate international and domestic
terrorism. To my knowledge, none focus solely on disaggregated domestic terrorism. In addition,
disaggregation allows the assessment of similar root causes for non-suicide and suicide terrorism, an
issue that has been debated much in the literature. Therefore, while it is valuable to assess the
determinants of aggregate domestic terrorism, disaggregation of terrorism represents a more refined
and expansive test of the potential causes of terrorism that is uniquely poised to contribute to the
literature. As I state in my argument, I expect non-suicide and suicide terrorism to share similar causes;
therefore, I expect the coefficients for the gender gap variables to exhibit analogous signs and levels of
significance for both non-suicide and suicide terrorism models.
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Table 2
ZINB regressions, Total Terrorism 1998-2009
Logit
Education gap

Model 1a
-.008
(.003)**

Labor gap

-

Negative binomial

Model 2a

Model 3a

-

-

-.006
(.010)

-

Model 1b
-.003
(.002)
-

Model 2b

Model 3b

-

-

.007
(.010)

-

-.210
-.070
(.064)***
(.047)
Lagged dependent
-.933
-.928
-.915
.017
.016
.016
variable
(.216)*** (.200)*** (.202)***
(.004)*** (.004)***
(.004)***
-.522
-.515
-.530
.325
.279
.303
Total pop
(.111)*** (.099)*** (.109)***
(.098)***
(.088)**
(.092)***
-.485
-.294
-.539
1.222
1.270
1.180
Previous civil conflict
(.370)
(.377)
(.370)
(.276)*** (.281)***
(.271)***
-1.956
-3.451
-2.006
3.359
2.664
3.487
Ethnic fractionalization
(2.449)
(2.187)
(2.398)
(2.145)
(1.886)
(2.005)
Squared ethnic
3.035
4.891
2.889
-4.726
-3.879
-4.882
fractionalization
(2.636)
(2.419)*
(2.626)
(2.138)*
(1.802)*
(2.020)*
-.093
-.102
-.096
.120
.038
.131
Polity
(.132)
(.124)
(.129)
(.145)
(.149)
(.137)
.003
.004
.004
-.002
.001
-.003
Squared polity
(.005)
(.005)
(.005)
(.006)
(.006)
(.006)
-.049
.054
.059
.070
.052
.099
GDP per capita
(.117)
(.122)
(.113)
(.124)
(.135)
(.122)
-.004
-.000
-.005
.001
.002
.001
% Muslim pop
(.006)
(.006)
(.005)
(.004)
(.004)
(.004)
Constant
11.077*** 9.824*** 10.946***
-5.937*
-5.058*
-5.754*
N
1642
1698
1695
1642
1698
1695
Non-zero obs
510
526
526
510
526
526
Zero obs
1132
1172
1169
1132
1172
1169
Clusters
143
143
143
143
143
143
2
Wald chi
278.86
270.03
301.21
278.86
270.03
301.21
p>chi2
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Observations clustered by country. *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001
Life expectancy gap

-

-

Non-suicide terrorism
Logistic regressions
Results of logistic regressions on the effect of gender inequality on non-suicide terrorism are
given below in Table 3. As with the logistic results for total terrorism, coefficients for the education and
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life expectancy gap variables are positive and highly statistically significant; this indicates that large
education and life expectancy gaps increase the risk of non-suicide terrorism, as I predict in Hypotheses
1 and 3, respectively. Similar to the total terrorism logistic results, the coefficient for the labor gap
variable is positive and statistically significant at nearly the .05 level using a one-tailed test, which
supports my second hypothesis that large labor gaps increase the risk of non-suicide terrorism.
As expected, population again increases the risk of terrorism and is highly statistically significant
in all three models. Previous civil conflict also increases the risk of non-suicide terrorism for all three
models and is generally statistically significant, as predicted. Again, the ethnic fractionalization variables
exhibit the expected non-monotonic relationships with non-suicide terrorism for all of the models,
though the relationships are generally statistically insignificant. As predicted in the literature, the polity
terms also exhibit a non-monotonic relationship in all three models, though polity is statistically
insignificant for the labor gap model. GDP per capita again increases the risk of non-suicide terrorism as
some predict, though the coefficients are statistically insignificant in all three models. Muslim
population increases the risk of terrorism for both education and life expectancy models as predicted,
though the relationships are statistically insignificant; for the labor gap model, however, Muslim
population decreases the risk of terrorism, though this relationship is also insignificant. The lagged
dependent variable is positive but not statistically significant for each of the models.

Table 3
Logistic regressions, Non-suicide Terrorism 1998-2009
Education gap

Model 1
.005
(.002)**

Model 2

Model 3

-

-

Labor gap

-

.013
(.009)

Life expectancy gap

-

-

Lagged dependent variable

.077
(.071)

.081
(.072)

Table cont.
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.135
(.042)***
.083
(.071)

Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
.534
.511
.540
Total pop
(.080)***
(.076)***
(.078)***
.840
.745
.858
Previous civil conflict
(.399)*
(.408)
(.387)*
2.334
3.089
2.361
Ethnic fractionalization
(2.059)
(2.008)
(2.031)
Squared ethnic
-3.397
-4.357
-3.263
fractionalization
(2.185)
(2.200)*
(2.177)
.199
.152
.204
Polity
(.101)*
(.098)
(.102)*
-.006
-.004
-.006
Squared polity
(.004)
(.004)
(.004)
.101
.006
.032
GDP per capita
(.087)
(.090)
(.084)
.004
-.000
.005
% Muslim pop
(.004)
(.005)
(.004)
Constant
-12.634***
-11.231***
-12.627***
N
1642
1698
1695
Clusters
143
143
143
2
Wald chi
123.41
130.18
126.45
p>chi2
0.000
0.000
0.000
2
Pseudo R
.264
.267
.272
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Observations clustered by country. *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001

Zero-inflated negative binomial regressions
I again use ZINB models to assess the effect of gender inequality on increasing the risk of nonsuicide terrorism. Results of these models are reported in Table 4 and are similar to those for total
terrorism. For the negative binomial stage of the model, the education gap reduces the count of
terrorist events, though the coefficient is statistically insignificant; the logit stage of the education model
indicates high statistical significance for reducing the probability of never experiencing non-suicide
terrorism, which supports my first hypothesis. Results are very similar for the life expectancy model and
support my third hypothesis; the logit stage for this model also indicates that large life expectancy gaps
increase the probability of experiencing non-suicide terrorism with high statistical significance, while the
negative binomial stage indicates that life expectancy gaps decrease the count of terrorist events,
though the relationship is statistically insignificant. The labor gap regression demonstrates the
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predicted positive and negative signs for the negative binomial and logit stages, respectively, but the
coefficients are statistically insignificant at conventional levels; therefore, ZINB regression results for the
labor gap model do not appear to support my second hypothesis regarding non-suicide terrorism.
As for the control variables, the coefficients for population in all three models are highly
statistically significant and indicate that population reduces the probability of never experiencing
terrorism and increases the count of non-suicide terrorist events, as predicted. Previous civil conflict
also increases the count of non-suicide terrorist events at high levels of statistical significance for all
three models as expected. The coefficients for ethnic fractionalization are statistically insignificant in all
three models, though the coefficients for the squared term are statistically significant for increasing the
count of terrorist events in each of the models; the results for the ethnic fractionalization models again
indicate non-monotonic relationships with non-suicide terrorism in all three models, as predicted in the
literature. The polity variables are statistically insignificant for all models but demonstrate the predicted
non-monotonic effects with non-suicide terrorism in each of the models except for labor participation.
The coefficients for GDP per capita as well as Muslim population are statistically insignificant for both
stages of all three models but generally indicate a positive relationship with the count of terrorist
events, as predicted by some in the literature. The lagged dependent variable decreases the probability
of never experiencing non-suicide terrorism and increases the count of terrorist events, and is highly
statistically significant in all of the models.
Overall, the results for the logistic and ZINB regressions for non-suicide terrorism indicate
support for Hypotheses 1 and 3; gender inequality in terms of education and life expectancy increase
the risk of experiencing non-suicide terrorism. Logistic regression results also support Hypothesis 2 that
large labor gaps increase the risk of non-suicide terrorism; however, the labor gap ZINB model does not
provide similar support.
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Table 4
ZINB regressions, Non-suicide Terrorism 1998-2009
Logit
Education gap

Model 1a
-.009
(.003)**

Labor gap

-

Negative binomial

Model 2a

Model 3a

-

-

-.006
(.010)

-

Model 1b
-.003
(.002)
-

Model 2b

Model 3b

-

-

.007
(.010)

-

-.211
-.073
(.064)***
(.048)
Lagged dependent
-.942
-.942
-.935
.017
.016
.017
variable
(.225)*** (.212)*** (.218)***
(.005)*** (.005)***
(.004)***
-.508
-.503
-.519
.326
.279
.304
Total pop
(.113)*** (.101)*** (.110)***
(.099)***
(.088)**
(.092)***
-.505
-.309
-.563
1.210
1.261
1.166
Previous civil conflict
(.372)
(.379)
(.373)
(.282)*** (.285)***
(.276)***
-1.873
-3.361
-1.948
3.306
2.603
3.443
Ethnic fractionalization
(2.455)
(2.191)
(2.406)
(2.156)
(1.898)
(2.013)
Squared ethnic
2.882
4.733
2.771
-4.662
-3.806
-4.830
fractionalization
(2.633)
(2.416)*
(2.627)
(2.153)*
(1.819)*
(2.032)*
-.070
-.085
-.070
.142
.053
.155
Polity
(.136)
(.128)
(.134)
(.153)
(.157)
(.145)
.002
.003
.003
-.003
.000
-.004
Squared polity
(.006)
(.005)
(.006)
(.006)
(.006)
(.006)
-.046
.055
.063
.076
.056
.106
GDP per capita
(.116)
(.122)
(.114)
(.125)
(.136)
(.124)
-.003
.000
-.005
.001
.002
.001
% Muslim pop
(.006)
(.006)
(.006)
(.004)
(.004)
(.004)
Constant
10.738*** 9.561*** 10.639***
-6.088*
-5.151*
-5.916***
N
1642
1698
1695
1642
1698
1695
Non-zero obs
507
522
522
507
522
522
Zero obs
1135
1176
1173
1135
1176
1173
Clusters
143
143
143
143
143
143
2
Wald chi
276.36
260.15
296.46
276.36
260.15
296.46
p>chi2
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Observations clustered by country. *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001
Life expectancy gap

-

-

Suicide terrorism
Logistic regressions
Logistic regression results on the effect of gender inequality on the risk of suicide terrorism are
reported below in Table 5. The results initially appear quite different from those for non-suicide logistic
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regressions. Whereas the education and life expectancy gap coefficients are highly statistically
significant for increasing the risk of non-suicide terrorism, the same variables are statistically
insignificant for increasing the risk of suicide terrorism. The labor gap variable also increases the risk of
suicide terrorism and the coefficient is statistically significant near the .05 level using a one-tailed test,
which is similar to the logistic results for non-suicide terrorism.
As with non-suicide terrorism, population increases the risk of suicide terrorism with high
statistical significance in each model as predicted. As expected, previous civil conflict also increases the
risk of suicide terrorism, and the coefficients are highly statistically significant in all three models.
Coefficients for the polity variable and its squared term are statistically insignificant in all three models,
but do support the notion that regime type is also non-monotonically related to suicide terrorism, as
Pape (2003) maintains. Coefficients for GDP per capita reveal a negative relationship with suicide
terrorism, though the relationships are insignificant for all three models; this seems to support those
authors such as Graham (2002) that argue increased development decreases the risk of terrorism.
Muslim population, as expected, is highly statistically significant for increasing the risk of suicide
terrorism for both education and life expectancy gap models, while the coefficient for the labor gap
model is statistically insignificant for increasing the risk of terrorism. The lagged dependent variable
increases the risk of suicide terrorism in all three models and generally reaches statistical significance.
The coefficients for the ethnic fractionalization variables are very large and highly statistically
significant for all three models, indicating a strongly significant relationship with suicide terrorism; the
effects are quite magnified relative to the total terrorism and non-suicide terrorism models and again
indicate a non-monotonic relationship with suicide terrorism for all three models. Therefore, I run the
logistic regressions for suicide terrorism without the ethnic fractionalization variables to determine the
resultant effects for the gender gap variables. Without ethnic fractionalization terms, both education
and life expectancy gap coefficients achieve high statistical significance for increasing the risk of suicide
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terrorism. The results for the labor gap variable indicate that removing the ethnic fractionalization
variables results in a loss of significance for increasing the risk of terrorism even using a one-tailed test.
Without ethnic fractionalization terms, the GDP per capita variable also experiences changes, both in
direction and significance; GDP per capita increases the risk of suicide terrorism the in the absence of
ethnic fractionalization variables, and the coefficient nears conventional levels of statistical significance
in the labor gap model. The polity variables also reverse signs in the models without ethnic
fractionalization variables, though the coefficients remain statistically insignificant. The other control
variables exhibit relatively similar results to the models including ethnic diversity.
In essence, it appears that ethnic fractionalization is much more influential in terms of the risk of
suicide than non-suicide terrorism. In the presence of these variables, none of the gender gap variables
approaches statistical significance at conventional levels, though labor inequality is statistically
significant using a one-tailed test. When I remove ethnic fractionalization terms from the models, both
education and life expectancy gaps achieve high statistical significance for increasing the risk of suicide
terrorism, while the labor gap variable loses statistical significance even using one-tailed tests for
increasing the risk of terrorism. Thus, when it is included ethnic fractionalization appears to overwhelm
the effects of gender inequality in terms of the risk of suicide terrorism for education and life expectancy
gaps. However, given that education and life expectancy gaps achieve high statistical significance
without ethnic fractionalization, ethnic fractionalization may be acting as an intervening variable in the
relationship between gender inequality and suicide terrorism; Caprioli (2005) supports this with her
theory linking gender inequality to intrastate conflict. Ethnic fractionalization is negatively and weakly
correlated with both education and life expectancy gaps (-.11 and -.36, respectively), while the labor gap
and ethnic fractionalization are also weakly correlated at .003.
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Table 5
Logistic regressions, Suicide Terrorism 1999-2009
Education gap
Labor gap
Life expectancy
gap
Lagged
dependent
variable

Model 1a
.002
(.003)

Model 1b
.008
(.002)***

Model 2a

Model 2b

Model 3a

Model 3b

-

-

-

-

-

-

.026
(.018)

.017
(.023)

-

-

-

-

-

-

.033
(.077)

.182
(.069)**

.420
(.232)

.565
(.255)*

.453
(.245)

.629
(.252)*

.460
(.235)*

.609
(.258)*

.696
.559
.693
.565
.718
.625
(.163)***
(.183)**
(.155)***
(.176)***
(.159)***
(.177)***
Previous civil
1.58
1.420
1.630
1.431
1.518
1.384
conflict
(.416)***
(.537)**
(.422)***
(.496)**
(.422)***
(.526)**
Ethnic
18.671
19.490
18.495
fractionalization
(6.847)**
(5.424)***
(6.559)***
Squared ethnic
-23.664
-25.501
-23.611
fractionalization (7.376)***
(6.196)***
(7.150)***
-.079
.024
-.0892
.163
-.023
.064
Polity
(.203)
(.170)
(.192)
(.222)
(.194)
(.157)
.005
-.000
.005
-.007
.002
-.003
Squared polity
(.009)
(.007)
(.008)
(.010)
(.008)
(.007)
-.179
.243
-.194
.303
-.164
.179
GDP per capita
(.182)
(.154)
(.189)
(.175)
(.192)
(.174)
.017
.021
.008
.010
.016
.020
% Muslim pop
(.006)**
(.007)**
(.007)
(.009)
(.005)**
(.006)***
Constant
-18.182*** -17.041*** -18.145*** -17.453*** -18.702*** -17.992***
N
1507
1507
1557
1557
1554
1554
Clusters
143
143
143
143
143
143
Wald chi2
261.10
253.51
206.18
98.99
228.64
152.08
p>chi2
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
Pseudo R2
.415
.354
.428
.349
.420
.361
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Observations clustered by country. *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001
Total pop

Zero-inflated negative binomial regressions
As with the total terrorism and non-suicide terrorism models, I employ ZINB regressions to
further determine the effect of gender inequality on the risk of suicide terrorism. The results of these
regressions are reported below in Table 6. Unlike the results for non-suicide terrorism, the coefficient
for education inequality reveals a statistically significant reduction of the count of suicide terrorist
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events, which does not support my first hypothesis; the results for the logit stage of the model reveal
that large education gaps reduce the probability of never experiencing suicide terrorism, though the
relationship is statistically insignificant. Results are similar for the life expectancy gap model and do not
provide support for Hypothesis 3; the coefficient for the negative binomial stage of the model reveals
high statistical significance for reducing the count of suicide terrorist events, while the logit stage reveals
that large life expectancy gaps reduce the probability of never experiencing terrorism, though the
relationship is statistically insignificant. As for labor participation inequality, the results of the regression
also do not support my second hypothesis; coefficients for both the negative binomial and logit stages
of the model are negative and statistically insignificant.
The coefficients for population are statistically significant for decreasing the probability of never
experiencing suicide terrorism in all three models as expected, and the coefficient is statistically
significant for increasing the count of suicide terrorist events in the education gap model. Previous civil
conflict also reduces the probability of never experiencing suicide terrorism in all three models, though
the coefficients are all statistically insignificant; a history of civil conflict also increases the count of
suicide terrorist events in each of the models, though the coefficient is only statistically significant for
the life expectancy gap model. In all three models, regime type exhibits a non-monotonic relationship
with suicide terrorism as the literature predicts, though the relationships are all statistically insignificant.
GDP per capita coefficients are statistically insignificant in all of the models but indicate that
development increases the risk of suicide terrorism, as some predict. The coefficients for Muslim
population are statistically significant for reducing the probability of never experiencing terrorism for
both the education and life expectancy gap models, as predicted; for the labor gap model, Muslim
population is statistically insignificant for decreasing the probability of never experiencing suicide
terrorism. Coefficients for the lagged dependent variable are statistically significant for decreasing the
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probability of never experiencing suicide terrorism in all three models, and the coefficient is statistically
significant for increasing the count of suicide terrorism in the labor gap model.
The coefficients for the ethnic fractionalization variables are again large and highly significant;
ethnic fractionalization and its squared term are highly significant for increasing the count of suicide
terrorist events in all three models and demonstrate a non-monotonic relationship with suicide
terrorism. Once these variables are removed, however, results improve for the education and life
expectancy gap models, similar to the previous logistic regressions. In the absence of ethnic
fractionalization terms, both education and life expectancy inequality increase the probability of
experiencing suicide terrorism with high statistical significance; these results support my first and third
hypotheses for education and life expectancy gaps, respectively. Results for the labor participation gap
model remain similar to those when ethnic fractionalization variables are included in the model and do
not appear to support my second hypothesis.
Several of the control variables experience changes in signs and significance when ethnic
fractionalization is removed. Coefficients for population reverse signs in the negative binomial stages of
all three models, though the coefficients are statistically insignificant; the results for the logit stages of
all three models remain similar to previous results with ethnic fractionalization. The logit results for
previous civil conflict remain similar to models including ethnic fractionalization variables, but the
coefficients gain statistical significance for increasing the count of suicide terrorist events for all three
models. Polity variables retain previous signs in all three models and continue to demonstrate nonmonotonic effects with suicide terrorism. The coefficients for GDP per capita and Muslim population
also remain similar to models with ethnic fractionalization terms. Coefficients for the lagged dependent
variable become statistically significant for increasing the count of suicide terrorist events in all three
models while retaining previous statistical significance for decreasing the probability of never
experiencing suicide terrorism.
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Overall, as with the logistic regression results, ZINB regression results indicate that ethnic
fractionalization significantly relates to the risk of suicide terrorism, and the magnitude of this effect
seems to overwhelm the effects of gender inequality in terms of education and life expectancy. Logistic
and ZINB regression results for labor inequality indicate no significant relationship with suicide terrorism
regardless of the inclusion of ethnic diversity, which does not support my second hypothesis. Without
ethnic fractionalization variables, education and life expectancy gender gaps both appear to increase the
risk of experiencing suicide terrorism with high statistical significance, which supports my hypotheses
regarding these gender gaps.
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Table 6
ZINB regressions, Suicide Terrorism 1999-2009
Logit

Education
gap

Model
1a
-.007
(.005)

Model
1b
-.011
(.003)**

Labor gap

-

-

Negative binomial

Model
2a

Model
2b

Model
3a

Model
3b

Model
1c
-.006
(.002)**

Model
1d
-.001
(.003)

-

-

-

-

-.027
(.028)

-.013
(.027)

-

-

-

-

-.304
(.114)**

-

-

Model
2c

Model
2d

Model
3c

Model
3d

-

-

-

-

-.003
(.008)

-.002
(.011)

-

-

-

-

-.143
(.042)**
*

-.075
(.062)

Life
expectancy
gap

-

-

-

-

-.163
(.117)

Lagged
dependent
variable

-3.062
(1.510)*

-2.736
(1.302)*

-3.196
(.952)**
*

-3.393
(1.016)*
**

-3.736
(1.316)*
*

-3.716
(1.797)*

.034
(.031)

.123
(.027)**
*

.054
(.024)*

.126
(.021)**
*

.022
(.035)

.103
(.030)**
*

Total pop

-.723
(.319)*

-1.105
(.436)*

-.849
(.297)**

-1.106
(.372)**

-.829
(.314)**

-1.109
(.303)**
*

.383
(.193)*

-.254
(.289)

.248
(.176)

-.280
(.222)

.281
(.166)

-.207
(.198)

-.666
(1.285)

-.427
(.888)

-.851
(1.027)

-.449
(.863)

-.412
(1.178)

-.134
(.925)

1.173
(.692)

1.453
(.717)*

1.003
(.528)

1.445
(.697)*

1.343
(.592)*

1.591
(.661)*

8.934
(9.392)

-

6.166
(7.869)

-

8.399
(10.411)

-

31.833
(9.603)*
**

-

28.155
(7.637)*
**

-

30.143
(8.884)*
**

-

-3.793
(10.529)

-

1.265
(9.001)

-

-3.338
(11.171)

-

-34.884
(9.961)*
**

-

-29.871
(8.214)*
**

-

-33.346
(8.908)*
**

-

.404
(.400)
-.021
(.016)

.246
(.266)
-.016
(.012)

.415
(.248)
-.021
(.011)

.200
(.267)
-.013
(.011)

.380
(.383)
-.020
(.015)

.210
(.309)
-.015
(.014)

.223
(.259)
-.009
(.011)

.214
(.227)
-.013
(.011)

.176
(.149)
-.007
(.007)

.193
(.157)
-.012
(.006)

.238
(.222)
-.010
(.009)

.272
(.225)
-.016
(.010)

Previous
civil
conflict
Ethnic
fractionalization
Squared
ethnic
fractionalization
Polity
Squared
polity

Table cont.
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Logit

Negative binomial

Model
1a
.476
(.364)

Model
1b
.102
(.377)

Model
2a
.613
(.349)

Model
2b
.142
(.364)

%
Muslim
pop

-.032
(.012)**

-.032
(.010)**

-.017
(.013)

-.021
(.012)

Constant

9.175

23.368*

10.018

N
Non-zero
obs
Zero obs
Clusters
2
Wald chi
2
p>chi

1507

1507

1557

22.232*
*
1557

48

48

51

51

GDP per
capita

1459
143
175.61
0.000

Model
3a
.587
(.348)
-.033
(.011)*
*

1554

Model
3b
.307
(.315)
-.037
(.009)**
*
22.962*
**
1554

51

51

10.800

Model
1c
.240
(.231)

Model
1d
.375
(.395)

Model
2c
.231
(.158)

Model
2d
.351
(.333)

Model
3c
.288
(.198)

Model
3d
.461
(.270)

-.001
(.004)

.002
(.008)

.007
(.003)

.004
(.006)

-.002
(.004)

-.002
(.005)

-16.090**

.755

-13.641***

1.396

-13.996*

-.408

1507

1507

1557

1557

1554

1554

48

48

51

51

51

51

1503
143
201.87
0.000

1503
143
42.84
0.000

1459
1506
1506
1503
1503
1459
1459
1506
1506
143
143
143
143
143
143
143
143
143
57.45
306.38
96.19
201.87
42.84
175.61
57.45
306.38
96.19
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Observations clustered by country. *p≤.05; **p≤.01; ***p≤.001
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Discussion and Conclusion
My results indicate that gender inequality does influence domestic terrorism; logistic regression
results indicate that both education and life expectancy gender gaps increase the risk of total and nonsuicide terrorism with high statistical significance. In addition, these effects are robust to the inclusion
of ethnic fractionalization, which appears to relate substantially to suicide terrorism. Zero-inflated
negative binomial regression results also attest to the robust and statistically significant influence
education and life expectancy gaps have on increasing the risk of experiencing total and non-suicide
terrorism. These results support Hypotheses 1 and 3, which predict that large education and life
expectancy gaps, respectively, increase the risk of total and non-suicide domestic terrorism. Results are
more mixed for labor inequality; the variable approaches conventional levels of significance in the
logistic models for increasing the risk of total and non-suicide terrorism, but ZINB regression results for
the labor gap indicate little influence on total or non-suicide terrorism. The overall results regarding
labor gap models do not appear to support Hypothesis 2, which predicts that large labor gaps increase
the risk of total and non-suicide domestic terrorism.
The relationship between gender inequality and suicide terrorism appears more complicated
due to the strong, statistically significant influence of ethnic fractionalization. When ethnic
fractionalization variables are included in the models, neither education nor life expectancy variables
are statistically significant for logistic or ZINB models. However, in the absence of ethnic
fractionalization terms both of these gender gap variables become highly statistically significant for
increasing the risk of suicide terrorism, as I predict in Hypothesis 1 and 3. Results for labor gap logistic
and ZINB models indicate that labor inequality is generally unrelated to suicide terrorism, regardless of
the inclusion of ethnic diversity variables, which does not support my second hypothesis regarding labor
inequality. These results indicate that ethnic fractionalization has a more magnified effect on suicide
than non-suicide terrorism; nevertheless, gender inequality in the forms of education and life
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expectancy significantly contribute to the risk of both non-suicide and suicide terrorism once ethnic
fractionalization is removed for the suicide models, which provides some support to those who suggest
non-suicide and suicide terrorism emerge from the same causes. A caveat to this argument might be
that while causes may relate in issue, their magnitudes may differ between non-suicide and suicide
terrorism. One reason for these results could be found in an argument Caprioli makes regarding the
effect of gender equality on intrastate conflict; Caprioli links mobilization for ethnic rebellion to calls to
strict gender roles reinforcing the subordination of females to males, which are produced through
structural inequality. In addition, the greater measure of self-sacrifice required for suicide terrorism to
occur may necessitate more than one level of discrimination to compound grievances. Perhaps future
research could examine ethnic fractionalization or polarization as an intervening variable in the
relationship between gender inequality and suicide terrorism, which may explain the results found here.
Also, one could examine the impact of ethnic fractionalization on gender inequality; it may be that
ethnic diversity significantly affects gender inequality, in which case the reverse of Caprioli’s argument
may apply to suicide terrorism.
Overall, the results of the models indicate support for my hypotheses regarding the relationship
between gender inequality in terms of education and life expectancy and the risk of domestic terrorism.
The results do not indicate such support for the hypothesized relationship between labor inequality and
the risk of domestic terrorism; I suspect that this may be due to the less prominent role the state plays
in economic welfare relative to health and education welfare. While I expect that private medical and
school facilities exist in every society, public health and school facilities funded and maintained by the
state likely assist the majority of the population in most societies; therefore, the state assumes the
predominant blame for inequality in healthcare and education. However, the relationship between the
state and labor participation may differ. The state employs many people and may hire or purport to hire
male and female workers in roughly equal numbers, and private employment likely equals or
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outnumbers public employment in many societies. Furthermore, competition for public jobs in societies
with weak private sectors probably excludes many people of both genders. In addition, the influence of
the international economy on private jobs loss or creation likely hinders the ability of the state to
directly induce labor participation for either gender, particularly in the post-9/11 interdependent global
economy. Therefore, the public may not directly blame the state for gender inequality in labor
participation, whereas the state is still likely the primary source of funding for public health facilities and
schools, so the state is more directly tied to these socioeconomic indicators than labor, thus providing a
potential explanation for the lack of a relationship of labor gender gaps to terrorism as observed here.
The generally poor quality of terrorism data, and particularly the low number of non-zero
observations of suicide terrorism, suggests that results must be taken with caution, as with most
empirical studies of terrorism. The short time frame for all of the models suggests that generalizability is
mostly limited to the post-9/11 world; perhaps with more comprehensive domestic terrorism data for
years prior to 1998, particularly suicide terrorism, the tests could elicit stronger results and allow for
greater generalizability. Nevertheless, certain aspects of socioeconomic gender inequality have robust
relationships with terrorist attacks for the period studied; these results combined with the attempt to
disaggregate domestic terrorism provide a new contribution to the terrorism literature.
In addition, the results of this paper bring to mind a number of ideas for future research. Of
course, the analysis of gender inequality and terrorism using other indicators of socioeconomic and
additional types of grievances presents a ripe source for future research; in particular, researchers could
begin by focusing on the impact of indicators such as fertility rates that previous authors use in studies
on gender inequality and civil and international conflict. Studies could also focus on the potential
relationship between gender inequality and international terrorism, which has a foundation in the
gender inequality and international conflict literature. Future studies could also evaluate the impact of
an interactive effect between labor participation and education, as some authors have previously
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proposed (Kavanagh 2010; Harrison 2003). As I suggest above, further research could focus on potential
indirect relationships between gender inequality and terrorism; for example, gender inequality may
indirectly affect terrorism through decreases in development. Also, gender inequality may indirectly
increase the risk of terrorism by decreasing good governance. Limiting the cases in this study to
developing countries may also generate interesting findings, given the mixed results regarding
development and terrorism noted in the literature.
Also, further research could examine whether gender inequality affects lower levels of political
instability and violence, such as non-violent and violent protests, demonstrations, and other types of
conflict; this type of research may illuminate whether gender inequality relates strictly to violent
political conflict or to all forms of political protest and at what point the transition between non-violent
protest and violent conflict takes place, particularly in terms of overcoming the collective action
problem. Some have also suggested that terrorism is in part driven by a sense of embarrassment
produced by comparison of one’s circumstances to those abroad. As Atran (2003, p. 1536) notes,
terrorism can form due to “social humiliation vis-à-vis global power and allies.” Johnson (2001) further
argues that economic evaluation relative to foreigners can spur terrorism through feelings of inferiority
and ensuing anger. Future studies could address this issue by focusing on the impact of state gender
gaps in socioeconomic or other indicators relative to corresponding regional or global gender gaps on
terrorism. In addition, the results of this paper point out the need for further study on the influence of
ethnic fractionalization on suicide terrorism. Such studies would further contribute to the ongoing
research regarding the differences and similarities between non-suicide and suicide terrorism.
Finally, as Moghadam (2005) notes, terrorism studies may take place on three levels of analysis–
here, I have chosen to study the environmental or structural causes of terrorism, but the individual and
organizational levels are also vital to terrorism research. The case of the Tamil Tigers, one of the world’s
most prolific terrorist organizations, exhibits this point nicely, particularly in reference to gender
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inequality. The Tigers are known for recruiting large numbers of females during their days of political
struggle. Feminist rhetoric and the chance to be treated as men’s equals attracted many women, often
from rural parts of society, to the organization, where male and female members were indeed treated
virtually equally, except in terms of political leadership. However, the Tigers’ inclination for gender
parity did not carry over into Tamil society, which is very socially and politically conservative in terms of
gender. While men and women are relatively equal regarding school enrollment and labor participation,
women suffer from political and social discrimination; for instance, the society is prone to a high rate of
domestic violence, and women traditionally wear long hair and skirts and are considered subservient to
males. Due to the unpopularity among the Tamil society for the notion of abandoning traditional
gender roles, the Tigers instead focused on sentiments related to ethnicity and nationalism to gain
broad support for their cause. Female Tigers were even known to stop civilian females on the streets for
violations such as too-short skirts. However, once they left the organization, female Tigers often had
difficulty re-adjusting to society; they frequently had short hair and were thought to have defied
traditional female gender roles (N. Gowrinathan, personal communication, 2010). Berko and Erez
(2006) uncover a similar story for Palestinian female suicide terrorists. Drawn to terrorist organizations
because they want to defy their strict gender roles in a patriarchal society, female terrorists instead
often reinforce traditional gender roles even inside the terrorist organizations; they are exploited into
suicide missions, and the shame brought upon their families for being unable to control their daughters
leaves these female terrorists trapped in the terrorist organizations once they join. Like the Tamil
Tigers, female participation in Palestinian terrorist organizations did not translate into improved gender
equality in the broader society.
The interesting cases of the Tamil Tigers and Palestinian female terrorists illustrate the need for
better terrorism data on all three levels of analysis. One could then investigate the individual
motivations of female Tamil Tigers in terms of gender inequality; the organizational motivations for
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promoting gender inequality within its ranks and choosing not to attempt to transplant such an ideology
to the surrounding society; and the structural motivations for terrorism, including gender inequality in
political and social aspects as well as ethnic fractionalization. In addition, these cases demonstrate the
need for research dedicated to determining the potential impact of terrorism on gender inequality, and
what effects terrorist group ideologies could have on this relationship.
In terms of policy implications, the terrorism data limitations restrict generalizability mainly to
the post 9/11 era. Nevertheless, the results of robust relationships for gender gaps in education and life
expectancy to terrorism do allow for policy suggestions regarding the role of gender equality in the
reduction of terrorism. Domestically, states should examine the current status of social spending,
particularly health and education spending, legislation, and state-funded programs in reference to
gender parity. They should speak to community and political activists to determine the severity of
gender gap grievances. From there, the state can adjust social spending, legislation, and state-funded
programs to reduce gender inequality. State intelligence services should closely monitor communities
they expect are currently or likely engaged in terrorism and target education and health spending to
increase gender parity in these areas first, as a sort of triage approach to reducing the risk of terrorism.
Internationally, states that wish to reduce the risk of domestic terrorism spreading to the interstate
arena could consider tying foreign aid to the precondition that legislating bodies of aid recipients with
significant gender inequality begin reserving blocks of seats to encourage the move toward gender
parity, which would further promote equitable social spending. More generally, states could link foreign
aid to a more equitable division of social spending in terms of gender and encourage legislation that
promotes gender equality in socioeconomic and other issues. For those states that balk at the idea of
defying traditional gender roles by endorsing gender parity, foreign aid donors could assert that gender
equality promotes development and is thus in the state’s overall best interest.
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To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first to explore empirically the relationship
between gender inequality and domestic terrorism; it is also the first to my knowledge that
disaggregates domestic terrorism into non-suicide and suicide terrorism to address the propensity for
the two to occur under the same circumstances. While a longer time frame and more comprehensive
terrorism data would enhance the generalizability and policy implications of the results, the overall
results indicate that socioeconomic gender parity insulates states against terrorist attacks at least in
post-9/11 times. Failing to provide this public good, however, leaves states vulnerable to domestic
terrorism. In the process of generating these results, this study also discovers a number of areas for
future research. This work is therefore a first step in the exploration of the impact of gender inequality
on such a destabilizing and deadly phenomenon as terrorism and thus stands as a new contribution to
the terrorism field.
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Appendix
Appendix 1: Summary Statistics, Total and Non-suicide models
Variable

N

Mean

Std. Dev

Min

Max

Education gap

2065

70.69

45.10

-23.89

295.06

Labor gap

2088

23.95

15.49

-8.80

68.5

Life expectancy gap

2137

4.81

2.38

-1.29

13.53

Polity

1883

14.19

6.57

1

21

163.53

1

441

Squared polity

1883 244.30

Previous civil conflict

2305

.13

.34

0

1

Ethnic fractionalization

1838

.48

.26

.002

1

Squared ethnic fractionalization 1838

.30

.25

4.00e-06

1

% Muslim population

1838

27.34

37.42

0

100

GDP per capita

2118

7.67

1.60

4.39

11.26

Population

2231

15.48

2.11

9.80

21.00
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Appendix 2: Summary Statistics, Suicide models
Variable

N

Mean

Std. Dev

Min

Max

Education gap

1895

70.06

45.10

-23.89

295.06

Labor gap

1914

23.74

15.43

-8.80

68.0

Life expectancy gap

1955

4.81

2.38

-1.29

13.53

Polity

1726

14.30

6.53

1

21

1726 246.10

163.0

1

441

Squared polity
Previous civil conflict

2111

.13

.34

0

1

Ethnic fractionalization

1683

.48

.26

.002

1

Squared ethnic fractionalization 1683

.30

.25

4.00e-06

1

% Muslim population

1683

27.40

37.44

0

100

GDP per capita

1943

7.70

1.60

4.39

11.26

Population

2046

15.48

2.11

9.80

21.00
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Appendix 3: Variable Correlation Matrix
Education
gap

Labor
gap

Life
expectancy
gap

Lagged
total
events

Lagged
nonsuicide
events

Lagged
suicide
events

Total
pop

Previous
civil
conflict

Ethnic
fractionalization

Squared ethnic
fractionalization

Polity

Squared
Polity

GDP
per
capita

Education gap

1.000

Labor gap

-.255

1.000

Life expectancy
gap

.793

-.171

1.000

Lagged total
events

.045

.036

.035

1.000

Lagged nonsuicide events

.045

.035

.036

.999

1.00

Lagged suicide
events

-.009

.062

-.025

.275

.253

1.00

Total pop

-.065

.074

-.035

.180

.179

.085

1.00

Previous civil
conflict

-.049

.092

-.115

.194

.192

.133

.274

1.00

Ethnic
fractionalization

-.108

.003

-.359

-.006

-.006

-.015

-.058

.162

1.00

Squared ethnic
fractionalization

-.145

-.053

-.390

-.023

-.022

-.030

-.034

.153

.970

1.00

Polity

.112

-,186

.381

.065

.065

.021

.094

-.078

-.290

-.279

1.00

Squared polity

.105

-.168

.397

.058

.058

.014

.076

-.115

-.335

-.325

.985

1.00

GDP per capita

.011

.129

.436

.040

.040

.009

-.008

-.223

-.461

-.473

.460

.539

1.00

% Muslim pop

-.242

.429

-.384

-.004

-.006

.074

.014

.083

.182

.146

-.521

-.522

-.249
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%
Muslim
pop

1.00
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